{Project}'s SIF images can be signed, and subsequently verified, so that a user can be confident that an image they have obtained is a bit-for-bit reproduction of the original container as the author intended it. The signature, over the metadata and content of the container, is created using a private key, and directly added to the SIF file. This means that a signed container carries it's signature with it, avoiding the need for extra infrastructure to distribute signatures to end users of the container.
A user verifies the container has not been modified since it was signed using a public key or certificate. By default, {Project} uses PGP keys to sign and verify containers. Signing and verifying containers with X.509 key material / certificates is also supported.
PGP Public keys for verification can be distributed manually, or can be uploaded to and automatically retrieved from a remote keyserver.
As well as indicating a container has not been modified, a valid signature may be used to indicate a container has undergone testing or review, and is approved for execution. Multiple signatures can be added to a container, to document its progress through an approval process. {Project}'s Execution Control List (ECL) feature can be enable by administrators of privileged installations to restrict execution of containers based on their signatures (see the admin guide for more information).
Note
To verify containers signed with Singularity versions older than
3.6.0 the --legacy-insecure flag must be provided to the
{command} verify command.
The verify command will check that a SIF container image has
been signed using a PGP key or certificate. This ensures that the container
image on your disk is a bit-for-bit reproduction of the original image.
$ {command} verify alpine_latest.sif
[REMOTE] Signing entity: Ian Kaneshiro (example key) <[email protected]>
[REMOTE] Fingerprint: 8232570480B868E1473AEEB03DBCBA1EE9D661E5
Objects verified:
ID |GROUP |LINK |TYPE
------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |FS
Container verified: my_container.sif
In this example you can see that Ian Kaneshiro has signed the container.
This feature is available with SIF images like those you can pull from container
libraries or OCI registries via oras://.
Note
{command} verify will only run against a local SIF file. You must
pull an image to a local disk before you can verify it.
To sign your own containers with a PGP key you first need to generate one or more keys.
You can use the newpair subcommand in the key command group like so:
$ {command} key newpair
Enter your name (e.g., John Doe) : Joe User
Enter your email address (e.g., [email protected]) : [email protected]
Enter optional comment (e.g., development keys) : demo
Enter a passphrase :
Retype your passphrase :
Generating Entity and OpenPGP Key Pair... done
The list subcommand will show you all of the keys you have created
or saved locally.
$ {command} key list
Public key listing (/home/ian/.{command}/keys/pgp-public):
0) User: Joe User (demo) <[email protected]>
Creation time: 2019-11-15 09:54:54 -0600 CST
Fingerprint: E5F780B2C22F59DF748524B435C3844412EE233B
Length (in bits): 4096
If you would like others in the community to easily be able to fetch your public key for image verification, you can push your key to a public keyserver.
First we can check which key server we have configured using:
$ {command} remote list
Cloud Services Endpoints
========================
NAME URI ACTIVE GLOBAL EXCLUSIVE
DefaultRemote cloud.apptainer.org YES YES NO
Keyservers
==========
URI GLOBAL INSECURE ORDER
https://keys.openpgp.org YES NO 1*
* Active cloud services keyserver
Authenticated Logins
=================================
URI INSECURE
oras://ghcr.io NO
Here we can see that we will be pushing to https://keys.openpgp.org. Now we can use the following command to push our key:
$ {command} key push 8232570480B868E1473AEEB03DBCBA1EE9D661E5
WARNING: No default remote in use, falling back to default keyserver: https://keys.openpgp.org
INFO: Key server response: Upload successful. This is a new key, a welcome email has been sent.
public key '8232570480B868E1473AEEB03DBCBA1EE9D661E5' pushed to server successfully
Note
The default key server keys.openpgp.org requires you to verify your key via email before the public key material will be accessible.
If you delete your local public PGP key, you can always locate and download it again like so.
$ {command} key search --long-list [email protected]
Showing 1 results
KEY ID BITS NAME/EMAIL
12EE233B 4096 Joe User (demo) <[email protected]>
$ {command} key pull 8232570480B868E1473AEEB03DBCBA1EE9D661E5
1 key(s) added to keyring of trust /home/ian/.{command}/keys/pgp-public
But note that this only restores the public key (used for verifying) to your local machine and does not restore the private key (used for signing). If you permanently delete your private key, there is no way to recover it.
{Project} allows you to search the keystore for public keys. You can search for
names, emails, and fingerprints (key IDs) provided that the backend keystore
supports these actions. When searching for a fingerprint, you need to use 0x
before the fingerprint, check the example:
# search for key ID:
$ {command} key search 0x8883491F4268F173C6E5DC49EDECE4F3F38D871E
# search for the sort ID:
$ {command} key search 0xF38D871E
# search for user:
$ {command} key search Godlove
# search for email:
$ {command} key search @gmail.com
Now that you have a key generated, you can use it to sign images like so:
$ {command} sign my_container.sif
Signing image: my_container.sif
Enter key passphrase :
Signature created and applied to my_container.sif
Because your public PGP key is saved locally you can verify the image without needing to contact the key server.
$ {command} verify my_container.sif
Verifying image: my_container.sif
[LOCAL] Signing entity: Joe User (Demo keys) <[email protected]>
[LOCAL] Fingerprint: 65833F473098C6215E750B3BDFD69E5CEE85D448
Objects verified:
ID |GROUP |LINK |TYPE
------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |FS
Container verified: my_container.sif
If you've pushed your key to a key server you can also verify this image
in the absence of a local public key. To demonstrate this, first
remove your local public key, and then try to use the verify
command again.
$ {command} key remove 8232570480B868E1473AEEB03DBCBA1EE9D661E5
$ {command} verify my_container.sif
Verifying image: my_container.sif
[REMOTE] Signing entity: Joe User (Demo keys) <[email protected]>
[REMOTE] Fingerprint: 65833F473098C6215E750B3BDFD69E5CEE85D448
Objects verified:
ID |GROUP |LINK |TYPE
------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |FS
Container verified: my_container.sif
Note that the [REMOTE] message shows the key used for verification was
obtained from a key server, and is not present on your local computer. You can
retrieve it, so that you can verify even if you are offline with {command} key
pull
$ {command} key pull 8232570480B868E1473AEEB03DBCBA1EE9D661E5
1 key(s) added to keyring of trust /home/ian/.{command}/keys/pgp-public
As well as the default behaviour, which signs all objects, fine-grained control of signing is possible.
If you sif list a SIF file you will see it is comprised of a number
of objects. Each object has an ID, and belongs to a GROUP. Since signatures are applied to objects, they have an ID but not a GROUP.
$ {command} sif list my_container.sif
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ID |GROUP |LINK |SIF POSITION (start-end) |TYPE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |32768-32800 |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |36864-39751 |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |40960-41055 |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |45056-2781184 |FS (Squashfs/*System/amd64)
5 |NONE |1 (G) |2781184-2782981 |Signature (SHA-256)
Note
The {command} sif commands will only run against a local SIF file. You
must pull an image to a local disk before you can examine it.
I can choose to sign and verify a specific object with the --sif-id
option to sign and verify.
$ {command} sign --sif-id 1 my_container.sif
Signing image: my_container.sif
Enter key passphrase :
Signature created and applied to my_container.sif
$ {command} verify --sif-id 1 my_container.sif
Verifying image: my_container.sif
[LOCAL] Signing entity: Joe User (Demo keys) <[email protected]>
[LOCAL] Fingerprint: 65833F473098C6215E750B3BDFD69E5CEE85D448
Objects verified:
ID |GROUP |LINK |TYPE
------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |Def.FILE
Container verified: my_container.sif
Note that running the verify command without specifying the specific
sif-id gives a fatal error. The container is not considered verified as
whole because other objects could have been changed without my
knowledge.
$ {command} verify my_container.sif
Verifying image: my_container.sif
[LOCAL] Signing entity: Joe User (Demo keys) <[email protected]>
[LOCAL] Fingerprint: 65833F473098C6215E750B3BDFD69E5CEE85D448
Error encountered during signature verification: object 2: object not signed
FATAL: Failed to verify container: integrity: object 2: object not signed
I can sign a group of objects with the --group-id option to
sign.
$ {command} sign --group-id 1 my_container.sif
Signing image: my_container.sif
Enter key passphrase :
Signature created and applied to my_container.sif
This creates one signature over all objects in the group. I can verify
that nothing in the group has been modified by running verify with
the same --group-id option.
$ {command} verify --group-id 1 my_container.sif
Verifying image: my_container.sif
[LOCAL] Signing entity: Joe User (Demo keys) <[email protected]>
[LOCAL] Fingerprint: 65833F473098C6215E750B3BDFD69E5CEE85D448
Objects verified:
ID |GROUP |LINK |TYPE
------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |FS
Container verified: my_container.sif
Because every object in the SIF file is within the signed group 1 the
entire container is signed, and the default verify behavior without
specifying --group-id can also verify the container:
$ {command} verify my_container.sif
Verifying image: my_container.sif
[LOCAL] Signing entity: Joe User (Demo keys) <[email protected]>
[LOCAL] Fingerprint: 65833F473098C6215E750B3BDFD69E5CEE85D448
Objects verified:
ID |GROUP |LINK |TYPE
------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |FS
Container verified: my_container.sif
{Project} also supports signing SIF container images using a PEM format private key, and verifying with a PEM format public key, or X.509 certificate. Non-PGP signatures are implemented using the Dead Simple Signing Envelope (DSSE) standard.
The {Project} GitHub repo contains keys and certificates useful for testing. If you want to use them to carry out the commands below, first, carry out the following commands:
$ git clone https://github.com/{orgrepo}.git
$ export KEYD="${PWD}/apptainer/test/keys"
$ export CERTD="${PWD}/apptainer/test/certs"
Information on creating PEM files can be found in the :ref:`encrypted container docs <sec:pem-file-encryption>`, and the method for creating certificates is documented here.
To sign a container using a private key in PEM format, provide the private key
material to the sign command using the --key flag.
$ {command} sign --key $KEYD/rsa-private.pem lolcow.sif
INFO: Signing image with key material from 'rsa_pri.pem'
INFO: Signature created and applied to image 'lolcow.sif'
The DSSE signature descriptor can now be seen by inspecting the SIF file:
$ {command} sif list lolcow.sif
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ID |GROUP |LINK |SIF POSITION (start-end) |TYPE
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |32176-32393 |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |32393-33522 |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |33522-33718 |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |36864-84656128 |FS (Squashfs/*System/amd64)
5 |NONE |1 (G) |84656128-84658191 |Signature (SHA-256)
$ {command} sif dump 5 lolcow.sif | jq
{
"payloadType": "application/vnd.{command}.sif-metadata+json",
...
Attempting to verify the image without options will fail, as it is not
signed with a PGP key:
$ {command} verify lolcow.sif
INFO: Verifying image with PGP key material
FATAL: Failed to verify container: integrity: key material not provided for DSSE envelope signature
Note that the error message shows that the container image has a DSSE signature present.
To verify a container using a PEM public key directly, provide the key material
to the verify command using the key flag:
$ {command} verify --key $KEYD/rsa-public.pem lolcow.sif
INFO: Verifying image with key material from 'rsa_pub.pem'
Objects verified:
ID |GROUP |LINK |TYPE
------------------------------------------------
1 |1 |NONE |Def.FILE
2 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
3 |1 |NONE |JSON.Generic
4 |1 |NONE |FS
INFO: Verified signature(s) from image 'lolcow.sif'
To verify a container that was signed with a PEM private key, using an X.509
certificate, pass the certificate to the verify command using the
--certificate flag. If the certificate is part of a chain, provide
intermediate and valid root certificates with the
--certificate-intermediates and --certificate-roots flags:
$ {command} verify \
--certificate $CERTD/leaf.pem \
--certificate-intermediates $CERTD/intermediate.pem \
--certificate-roots $CERTD/root.pem \
lolcow.sif
Note
The certificate must have a usage field that allows code signing in order to verify container images.
When verifying a container using X.509 certificates, {Project} can perform
online revocation checks using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). To
enable OCSP checks, add the --ocsp-verify flag to your verify command:
$ {command} verify \
--certificate $CERTD/leaf.pem \
--certificate-intermediates $CERTD/intermediate.pem \
--certificate-roots $CERTD/root.pem \
--ocsp-verify
lolcow.sif
{Project} will then attempt to contact the prescribed OCSP responder for each certificate in the chain, in order to check that the relevant certificate has not been revoked. In the event that an OCSP responder cannot be contacted, or a certificate has been revoked, verification will fail with a validation error:
INFO: Validate: cert:leaf issuer:intermediate FATAL: Failed to verify container: OCSP verification has failed