From 402d581a6631c180443c26c5caa784d7ba8ddf27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: urvishp80 Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2024 02:28:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Updated newly generated xml files --- ...s-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml | 20 ++++++----- ...0d05c6be71ec0951c3a5786f_OP-PAIRCOMMIT.xml | 24 ++++++++++++++ ...s-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml | 22 +++++++++++++ ...f8f55ab1_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK-VERIFY-ADD-.xml | 22 +++++++++++++ .../3514_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml | 24 ++++++++++++++ .../3515_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml | 22 +++++++++++++ .../3521_CTV-APO-CAT-activity-on-signet.xml | 26 +++++++++++++++ ...tocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml | 24 ++++++++++++++ ...tocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml | 28 +++++++++------- .../combined_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ ...tocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml | 28 +++++++++------- 11 files changed, 240 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) create mode 100644 static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/m53078da2568e93a70d05c6be71ec0951c3a5786f_OP-PAIRCOMMIT.xml create mode 100644 static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/ma5834901b1f12eaea319b5ba6982357905be04bd_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml create mode 100644 static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/mfe9c974e575666fb49b475a9d6fa184bf8f55ab1_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK-VERIFY-ADD-.xml create mode 100644 static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3514_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml create mode 100644 static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3515_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml create mode 100644 static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3521_CTV-APO-CAT-activity-on-signet.xml create mode 100644 static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3522_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml create mode 100644 static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml index 83014ee66..50bdd49b4 100644 --- a/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml @@ -2,28 +2,30 @@ 2 Combined summary - Broken links to the previous mailing list archive - 2024-11-14T02:20:40.305742+00:00 + 2024-11-15T02:27:56.179566+00:00 + + Andrew Poelstra 2024-11-14 14:30:00+00:00 + Weikeng Chen 2024-11-13 02:35:00+00:00 Bryan Bishop 2024-11-12 19:54:00+00:00 + python-feedgen 2 Combined summary - Broken links to the previous mailing list archive - 2024-11-14T02:20:40.305782+00:00 - - The discontinuation of hosting by the Linux Foundation for the static HTML email archives, specifically for bitcoin-dev and other mailing lists, has created a notable disruption within the Bitcoin community. This move has rendered many links, which once led to vital discussions and information about Bitcoin development, inoperative. The consequence of losing access to these archives is profound, given their role in housing essential, canonical details that have supported understanding and advancements within the Bitcoin ecosystem. - -In response to this challenge, the community has proposed several solutions to alleviate the impact of this transition. Among these, the redirect service offered by gnusha.org stands out for its simplicity and ease of use. By inputting an old URL, users can leverage this service to find the new location of the desired content within the archive, facilitated by a script that maps old URLs to their newer counterparts. This method ([gnusha.org/url redirect service](https://gnusha.org/url)) represents a convenient way for individuals to update broken links without needing extensive technical knowledge. + 2024-11-15T02:27:56.179610+00:00 + + The ongoing discussion raises concerns about the sustainability and reliability of hosting Bitcoin mailing lists, emphasizing the need for the community to secure its domain to ensure the longevity of critical communication channels. This arises from challenges experienced with external organizations like the Linux Foundation, which may not always provide indefinite support for Bitcoin-related projects. The conversation highlights an instance where the Linux Foundation agreed to host archives for the Bitcoin development community but later decided to discontinue this service. Such a move has significant implications, as it disrupts access to valuable resources and leaves numerous internet links leading to these resources broken. Despite this setback, the Linux Foundation's willingness to keep read-only archives accessible presents an opportunity for collaboration and eases the transition to a new domain. -For those seeking more hands-on control over the process, a Python script available on GitHub offers an alternative. This script allows for the manual resolution of URLs by converting them from the old Linux Foundation format to the updated archive locations. While this approach ([manual resolution script](https://gist.github.com/kanzure/4e7bcc58344ceaa1a668e65a434adb2bfile-resolver-py)) requires a greater degree of technical involvement, it provides another viable option for ensuring continued access to the archives. +The discontinuation of hosting by the Linux Foundation has prompted the Bitcoin community to explore alternatives for preserving access to vital content. Among the proposed solutions is a redirect service offered by gnusha.org, which facilitates the redirection of old URLs to new locations within the mailing list archives. This service operates on a straightforward mechanism requiring a previous URL input to map to a current archive location, offering a simple yet effective method for link updating. Additionally, a Python script available on GitHub provides another means to manually resolve URLs from their old Linux Foundation format to new destinations. This approach, although slightly more technical, ensures the continued accessibility of previously archived content, catering to those willing to undertake a more hands-on resolution process. -Choosing between the gnusha.org redirect service and the manual resolution method involves weighing the benefits of convenience against the need for accuracy and reliability in link validity. Despite the efficacy of these solutions, concerns remain regarding the integrity of the content, including the risks of incorrect redirects or compromised services. Nonetheless, the effort to maintain and update these archival resources highlights the community's commitment to preserving the historical and developmental record of Bitcoin and blockchain technologies. This collective endeavor reinforces the significance of these archives in facilitating ongoing dialogue and innovation within the field. - 2024-11-13T02:35:00+00:00 +The importance of maintaining access to these archives cannot be overstated, as they hold canonical information essential to the development and historical understanding of Bitcoin. As the community grapples with these changes, the collective endeavor to update and preserve these links underscores the critical nature of this content. Both the gnusha.org redirect service and the manual resolution script offer viable pathways to mitigate the impact of the Linux Foundation's decision, highlighting the community's resilience and commitment to safeguarding the accessibility of indispensable resources. The choice between utilizing the redirect service or engaging in manual resolution reflects broader considerations around ease of use and the assurance of content integrity, with each method presenting its advantages. + 2024-11-14T14:30:00+00:00 diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/m53078da2568e93a70d05c6be71ec0951c3a5786f_OP-PAIRCOMMIT.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/m53078da2568e93a70d05c6be71ec0951c3a5786f_OP-PAIRCOMMIT.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..853ada8f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/m53078da2568e93a70d05c6be71ec0951c3a5786f_OP-PAIRCOMMIT.xml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ + + + 0 + OP_PAIRCOMMIT + 2024-11-15T02:28:24.926949+00:00 + + moonsettler 2024-11-15 00:00:00+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 0 + OP_PAIRCOMMIT + 2024-11-15T02:28:24.926981+00:00 + + A new opcode, `OP_PAIRCOMMIT`, is proposed to be added to tapscript as part of the LNhance opcode family. This family includes CTV, CSFS, IKEY, and PC, aimed at enabling efficient rebindable channels adaptable to various covenant tree or channel factory constructions. The `OP_PAIRCOMMIT` operation functions by removing the top two values from the stack, computing a "PairCommit" tagged SHA256 hash of these elements, and pushing this commitment back onto the stack. This proposal is detailed in a [GitHub gist](https://gist.github.com/moonsettler/d7f1fb88e3e54ee7ecb6d69ff126433b) and has been submitted as PR: 1699 to the [bitcoin/bips repository](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips). + +The introduction of `OP_PAIRCOMMIT` addresses the dependency on the CAT opcode for constructing efficient LN-Symmetry. If CAT were available or its activation imminent, the necessity for `OP_PAIRCOMMIT` might not be as critical. However, given the current circumstances, `OP_PAIRCOMMIT` offers a targeted solution without the broader implications associated with CAT, such as enabling the inspection of sighashes on the stack and ancestor transactions, which could lead to novel two-way peg mechanisms. + +`OP_PAIRCOMMIT` specifically aims to minimize the number of SHA256 iterations required in its primary use case, thereby optimizing for LN-Symmetry. This optimization is particularly relevant in scenarios involving unilateral closes, where channel peers must reconstruct the spend script of an intermediate state. By employing `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY`, `OP_PAIRCOMMIT`, `OP_INTERNALKEY`, and `OP_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK` in sequence, a rebindable channel that remains optimal can be achieved. The opcode repurposes opcode 205 (formerly `OP_SUCCESS`) for its functionality, ensuring backward compatibility through a soft-fork deployment strategy. + +A reference implementation of the proposal is available for review at the [LNhance bitcoin repository](https://github.com/lnhance/bitcoin/pull/6/files). This initiative has garnered input and support from several contributors, including Jeremy Rubin, Brandon Black, Salvatore Ingala, and Anthony Towns, and is licensed under the BSD-3-Clause license. Further exploration and discussion regarding `OP_PAIRCOMMIT` and its implications for Bitcoin's scripting capabilities are encouraged within the community. + 2024-11-15T00:00:00+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/ma5834901b1f12eaea319b5ba6982357905be04bd_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/ma5834901b1f12eaea319b5ba6982357905be04bd_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1edea7c9a --- /dev/null +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/ma5834901b1f12eaea319b5ba6982357905be04bd_Broken-links-to-the-previous-mailing-list-archive.xml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + + 1 + Broken links to the previous mailing list archive + 2024-11-15T02:27:42.000192+00:00 + + Andrew Poelstra 2024-11-14 14:30:00+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Broken links to the previous mailing list archive + 2024-11-15T02:27:42.000221+00:00 + + In the realm of Bitcoin development, the challenge of maintaining an accessible and reliable email archive has proven to be significant. The absence of a centralized entity like a "Bitcoin mailing list" means there's no straightforward mechanism for purchasing domain or hosting services specifically for this purpose. Instead, the responsibility falls upon community members who volunteer their resources to sustain these archives, a solution that is not only temporary but also fraught with potential issues. This decentralized approach mirrors current efforts, such as those observed with the new gnusha.org archives, which rely on communal support rather than a dedicated organization. + +The theoretical solution of establishing an organization endowed with sufficient funds to manage such an archive faces practical obstacles. Despite the potential benefits of having a dedicated sysadmin funded by an endowment, the likelihood of finding an individual or group willing to commit substantial financial resources for the sake of preserving email archives remains low. This skepticism is further justified by past experiences, including issues faced with Linux Foundation servers and the vulnerability of even well-intentioned organizations to cyber threats, as demonstrated by the recent hack of the Internet Archive. + +These challenges underscore the fragility of relying on third-party organizations for the preservation of information. Even when an organization like the Linux Foundation, which shares a common ideology with the Bitcoin community regarding access to information, offers its servers, the reliability of such solutions is not guaranteed. This situation emphasizes the broader dilemma within the tech community about how best to ensure the longevity and accessibility of valuable digital archives in the face of technical, financial, and security challenges. + 2024-11-14T14:30:00+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/mfe9c974e575666fb49b475a9d6fa184bf8f55ab1_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK-VERIFY-ADD-.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/mfe9c974e575666fb49b475a9d6fa184bf8f55ab1_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK-VERIFY-ADD-.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99944040d --- /dev/null +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/mfe9c974e575666fb49b475a9d6fa184bf8f55ab1_CHECKSIGFROMSTACK-VERIFY-ADD-.xml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + + 0 + CHECKSIGFROMSTACK(VERIFY/ADD) + 2024-11-15T02:28:08.861553+00:00 + + Brandon Black 2024-11-14 22:02:00+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 0 + CHECKSIGFROMSTACK(VERIFY/ADD) + 2024-11-15T02:28:08.861583+00:00 + + The ongoing discussions around the CHECKSIGFROMSTACK (CSFS) Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) bring to light two primary considerations that are currently under debate. The first issue revolves around whether to include the CHECKSIGFROMSTACKVERIFY (CSFSV) opcode in pre-tapscript versions. Proponents argue that its compatibility with NOP forking justifies its inclusion, especially since it maintains consistency with CTV (CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY), which is designed as a NOP compatible upgrade. This approach would enable Schnorr signatures to be utilized across earlier script versions for specific applications, potentially enhancing the utility and flexibility of these scripts. However, there's an opposing viewpoint suggesting that without a clear, significant benefit, such as the case presented by bare CTV for earlier script versions, the inclusion of CSFSV might not be justified. The concern here centers on the efficient use of limited NOPs for extending Schnorr signature commitments to older scripts, questioning the value of this allocation. + +The second point of discussion focuses on the potential addition of CHECKSIGFROMSTACKADD (CSFSA). This proposal emerges from the recognition that if script multisig becomes a common method for verifying signatures on stack data, CSFSA could streamline the script-writing process, reducing the weight units (WU) required per key. Although the development and standardization of MuSig2 and FROST suggest that script multisig may not become the predominant application for these opcodes, the argument for including CSFSA hinges on the availability of OP_SUCCESSes. Allocating one for CSFSA is seen as a low-cost strategy for simplifying the creation of script multisigs, such as those enabled by miniscript, making them easier and less prone to errors. + +Brandon's communication to the mailing list invites feedback on these deliberations, indicating a readiness to adapt the BIP and implementations of CSFS(V/A) based on community input. This open invitation underscores the collaborative nature of Bitcoin protocol development, where diverse opinions are considered to refine and enhance proposals before formal adoption. + 2024-11-14T22:02:00+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3514_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3514_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dbf02dbe7 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3514_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ + + + 1 + Pluggable Channel Factories + 2024-11-15T02:25:57.255527+00:00 + + renepickhardt 2024-11-14 12:45:29.445000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Pluggable Channel Factories + 2024-11-15T02:25:57.255559+00:00 + + Exploring the innovative potential of channel factories in solving the "last mile problem" for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs), there's a notable interest in utilizing them as a practical solution. Channel factories, particularly when integrated with mechanisms like SuperScalar proposal VTXOs in Ark, present an intriguing approach to funding transactions for channels. This concept aligns with the broader vision of enhancing liquidity management and payment facilitation within the Lightning Network. + +The technical intricacies of channel factories, however, pose certain challenges, especially concerning their visibility and operability within the network. Current guidelines, as outlined in [BOLT7](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/aa5207aeaa32d841353dd2df3ce725a4046d528d/07-routing-gossip.md), highlight that channels within a factory are not observable on the blockchain, complicating their announcement and monitoring. This limitation underscores the necessity for adjustments or extensions to BOLT7 to accommodate the unique characteristics of channel factories effectively. + +Further examination into the subject reveals a promising direction for integrating channel factories into the network's routing nodes, as detailed in the referenced research. The proposition suggests that for the Lightning Network to adequately support liquidity management and address payment requests, the incorporation of channel factories is essential. To achieve this, a refined protocol is proposed that would enable the creation and closure of such channels to be communicated and verified through a dedicated API. This would offer a structured method for nodes to acknowledge the existence and status of these specialized channels, thereby facilitating more seamless transaction processes. + +In essence, the development and implementation of a protocol supporting pluggable channel factories could significantly enhance the operational dynamics of the Lightning Network. By providing a means for the secure and efficient establishment of channel factories, along with mechanisms for their monitoring and announcement, it is possible to advance the network's capabilities in managing liquidity and facilitating payments. + 2024-11-14T12:45:29.445000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3515_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3515_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e85a77383 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3515_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + + 1 + Pluggable Channel Factories + 2024-11-15T02:25:43.478333+00:00 + + ZmnSCPxj 2024-11-14 15:04:03.807000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Pluggable Channel Factories + 2024-11-15T02:25:43.478362+00:00 + + The discussion emphasizes the importance of implementing a mechanism within plugin software to monitor unilateral exits from channel factories on the blockchain, rather than relying solely on the base node software. This is essential because, even if the factory layer closes and channels within it are directly published on-chain, these channels can continue operating independently. The base node software will still monitor the blockchain for activity related to channels within factories, ensuring that any transition from a factory setting to a direct on-chain presence does not disrupt their functionality. However, there are scenarios where closing a factory might also close the hosted channels, such as specific edge cases like a SuperScalar instance timing out. In such instances, it's crucial for the factory plugin to communicate with the base node software to disregard the affected in-factory channel. + +Further, the conversation touches upon a past proposal aimed at enhancing how nodes gossip about channels by linking gossip capabilities to proof of shared control over on-chain funds. This approach was considered as a means to overcome limitations imposed by the Bitcoin blockchain's UTXO set on the expansion of the publicly gossiped network. The rationale behind requiring channel announcements to reference an unspent transaction output (TXO) is rooted in this limitation. Although implementing changes to facilitate gossip for channels within factories is deemed out of scope for the current discussion, it underscores the need for foundational adjustments in gossip protocols before addressing the intricacies of factory-hosted channels. + +Additionally, an alternative concept called "sidepools" is introduced, proposing a hybrid approach that combines direct on-chain N=2 mechanisms with off-chain N>2 mechanisms. This model aims to leverage the advantages of both setups, maintaining the simplicity and reliability of direct on-chain channels while enhancing liquidity management through more complex off-chain mechanisms. Sidepools could enable more efficient use of liquidity, potentially allowing for just-in-time rebalancing to optimize channel capacity utilization without necessitating changes to the existing gossip protocol. This concept exemplifies a strategic effort to balance the scalability and efficiency of channel management within the Lightning Network, leveraging the inherent strengths of the Bitcoin UTXO set to mitigate the challenges of network growth. + 2024-11-14T15:04:03.807000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3521_CTV-APO-CAT-activity-on-signet.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3521_CTV-APO-CAT-activity-on-signet.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c615f4027 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3521_CTV-APO-CAT-activity-on-signet.xml @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ + + + 0 + CTV, APO, CAT activity on signet + 2024-11-15T02:26:27.820852+00:00 + + ajtowns 2024-11-14 17:34:11.568000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 0 + CTV, APO, CAT activity on signet + 2024-11-15T02:26:27.820885+00:00 + + Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) 118, 119, and 347 have introduced significant changes to Bitcoin's scripting capabilities, as evidenced by their activation on signet. BIP 118 introduces `SIGHASH_ANYPREVOUT` (APO), allowing for more flexible transaction signing without specifying the previous output. Observations show that most transactions utilizing APO were for spending coinbase payouts, with a notable pattern of reusing APOAS signatures for sending block rewards back to faucet addresses, resulting in large amounts lost to fees. There was also a considerable use of APO for overriding `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` (CTV) in scripts, indicating a strategic application for structuring transactions with fixed signatures. + +BIP 119, related to `OP_CHECKTEMPLATEVERIFY` (CTV), has seen experimental applications, including transactions that implement a timeout pattern requiring a signature for a specific path and others that incorporate a preimage reveal alongside a signature. These uses reflect the proposal's intent to enable complex spend conditions and create more secure vault mechanisms. Some transactions directly utilized the CTV opcode in their scriptPubKey, indicating a straightforward approach to leveraging CTV's capabilities. + +The activation of `OP_CAT` under BIP 347 has not been detailed extensively in terms of specific use cases within the observed data. However, it's clear from the broad analysis of transactions on chain that OP_CAT's usage substantially outnumbers that of APO or CTV, primarily due to its integration into processes like the Proof of Work (PoW) faucet, which significantly contributes to its transaction volume. + +Innovative implementations were highlighted through transactions related to STARK verification and potential applications for vault or covenant behaviors. This includes using CAT/CHECKSIG for introspection, pointing towards its utility in creating more sophisticated contract structures, possibly enhancing security and functionality in Bitcoin scripting. + +An addendum provided insight into the method of tracking these innovations, involving modifications to a signet node's validation process to identify and log transactions utilizing these new features. This approach underscores the ongoing exploration and experimentation within the Bitcoin developer community to harness these advanced scripting capabilities for various practical and secure applications in the ecosystem. + 2024-11-14T17:34:11.568000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3522_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3522_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8a3de006b --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3522_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ + + + 1 + A Fast, Scalable Protocol For Resolving Lightning Payments + 2024-11-15T02:24:56.547420+00:00 + + morehouse 2024-11-14 20:52:41.355000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + A Fast, Scalable Protocol For Resolving Lightning Payments + 2024-11-15T02:24:56.547455+00:00 + + The OPR protocol introduces a mechanism where force-closing a channel does not yield any profit for either party involved, as long as both adhere to the guidelines and avoid manipulation. This fundamentally changes how disputes over HTLC (Hash Time Locked Contracts) resolutions are handled compared to the current Lightning Network protocol. In scenarios where a channel is force-closed under the OPR protocol, neither the initiator nor the responder of the HTLC benefits financially from the closure, eliminating the requirement for a minimum burn contribution to secure the channel against financial exploits. + +A notable aspect of the OPR protocol is its approach to handling potential griefing attacks—an asymmetric threat where the attacker incurs a smaller loss than the victim. An example provided illustrates a situation where, through strategic channel closure, one party could inflict financial harm on another, highlighting the potential for such attacks despite the non-profitability of force closures themselves. However, the protocol also offers a solution to mitigate the impact of unresolved HTLCs by allowing channels to remain open with diminished capacity, thus avoiding the need for immediate closure while still preventing the acceptance of incorrect HTLC resolutions off-chain. This approach aims to balance the risks and benefits of staying off-chain, offering a more cost-effective alternative to the current on-chain resolution mechanisms. + +Security concerns related to timing attacks and the reliability of network communications are addressed within the OPR protocol. The possibility of malicious actors manipulating timestamp information to falsely claim HTLC resolution in their favor is acknowledged. Yet, the protocol disincentivizes such behavior by imposing penalties on parties that engage in deceitful practices. It emphasizes the importance of establishing mutual agreement between parties on HTLC resolutions, suggesting several techniques to achieve consensus without relying solely on potentially unreliable external data. This focus on consensus and the penalization of dishonesty aim to ensure that, despite inherent network unreliabilities, the protocol remains robust against exploitation and maintains fairness in transaction resolutions. + +In summary, the OPR protocol presents a novel framework for managing HTLCs within payment channels, emphasizing security, fairness, and efficiency. By discouraging unprofitable force closures, mitigating the impact of griefing attacks, and addressing the challenges of network reliability and trust, it proposes a viable alternative to existing protocols that could lead to more sustainable and cost-effective network operations. + 2024-11-14T20:52:41.355000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml index 013490165..40161105f 100644 --- a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml @@ -2,15 +2,18 @@ 2 Combined summary - A Fast, Scalable Protocol For Resolving Lightning Payments - 2024-11-11T02:20:18.192150+00:00 + 2024-11-15T02:25:11.815179+00:00 - JohnLaw 2024-11-10 18:50:47.197000+00:00 + morehouse 2024-11-14 20:52:41.355000+00:00 - JohnLaw 2024-11-10 18:35:51.788000+00:00 + JohnLaw . 2024-11-10 18:50:47.197000+00:00 - harding 2024-11-10 18:03:56.191000+00:00 + JohnLaw . 2024-11-10 18:35:51.788000+00:00 + + + harding . 2024-11-10 18:03:56.191000+00:00 JohnLaw . 2024-11-10 00:06:59.715000+00:00 @@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ JohnLaw . 2024-10-31 22:50:15.637000+00:00 + @@ -43,17 +47,17 @@ 2 Combined summary - A Fast, Scalable Protocol For Resolving Lightning Payments - 2024-11-11T02:20:18.192263+00:00 - - The discourse around the Off-Chain Protocol Routing (OPR) system compared to the current Lightning Network reveals complexities in handling payment failures and vulnerabilities to attacks, such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) and probing. The OPR's approach to resolving Hash Time Locked Contracts (HTLCs) without adding to on-chain congestion introduces a trade-off between latency and node availability. A specific attack scenario detailed involves a node, referred to as Bob, suffering financial loss due to a DoS attack that disrupts communication, highlighting potential for exploitation by malicious actors aiming to profit from induced network failures. This underscores the necessity for OPR nodes to fortify against IP-layer attacks to maintain payment reliability, albeit with concerns over rising operational costs potentially leading to centralization. + 2024-11-15T02:25:11.815256+00:00 + + The Offchain Payment Resolution (OPR) protocol emerges as a significant advancement in cryptocurrency transaction protocols, specifically addressing the challenges and limitations inherent in the current lightning network system. The protocol is designed to ensure that all transactions, regardless of size, can be resolved swiftly and off-chain, thereby eliminating the need for costly on-chain transactions. This approach not only enhances the scalability of the network by reducing its on-chain footprint but also allows users to engage in transactions without the need for constant online presence, marking a notable improvement over existing systems. -Further analysis delves into economic incentives structured within the OPR protocol to discourage dishonest behavior through a griefer-penalized mechanism. This mechanism aims to secure transactions by ensuring mutual agreement on payment outcomes before funds can be reclaimed from a burn output, promoting integrity among participants. Conversely, the protocol suggests a novel method of managing HTLC resolutions by allowing cooperative channel closure even in cases of disputed HTLCs, a departure from current protocols that mandate force closures, thereby mitigating self-griefing costs associated with disputes. +A key feature of the OPR protocol is its security mechanism, which operates on a principle that discourages dishonest behavior through a griefer-penalized system. In this system, any attempt by a participant to exploit the protocol results in a loss proportional to the intended damage, effectively deterring malicious actions and ensuring secure transactions among parties. This is a departure from traditional trust-based systems, where users risk theft, or trust-free protocols, which do not penalize dishonesty as effectively. -The discussion also touches on the broader implications of adopting OPR, including its potential to streamline small-scale transactions by eliminating the need for on-chain resolution, thus enhancing scalability and user experience. The introduction of conditional fees for transaction attempts, regardless of success, is proposed as a solution to disincentivize flood attacks using probes. However, this measure raises concerns about increased routing costs and the economic viability of the OPR system, especially when juxtaposed with the current fee structures of the Lightning Network. +The protocol also introduces innovative solutions to operational risks, such as disagreements over Hash Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) or channel partner failures. These include the use of synchronized clocks and time-stamped logs for hash preimages, enhancing the accuracy and reliability of transaction resolutions. Despite these advancements, the protocol acknowledges potential fund losses due to node failures and attempts to mitigate this risk through increased routing fees, highlighting a balanced approach to operational efficiency and security. -Addressing operational risks, the conversation emphasizes the importance of implementing synchronized clocks and time-stamped logs to accurately assess transaction outcomes amidst network inconsistencies. Although this approach aims to mitigate fund loss due to node or communication failures, it acknowledges the inherent challenges in distinguishing between genuine network delays and potential malicious actions, underscoring the intricate balance required between security, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness in off-chain payment systems. +Moreover, the OPR protocol's compatibility with technologies like channel factories and hierarchical channels suggests promising avenues for further scalability and usability enhancements. It supports immediate payment resolution, significantly improving the user experience, especially for casual users who may not maintain a constant online presence. -In conclusion, the dialogue surrounding the OPR protocol sheds light on its innovative contributions towards improving the scalability and adoption of lightning network transactions by facilitating quicker, safer off-chain payments. Despite the highlighted challenges and trade-offs, such as the need for heightened security measures and potential increases in operational costs, the overall sentiment leans towards optimism regarding the protocol's ability to advance cryptocurrency transactions, particularly in enhancing the user experience for casual participants in the lightning network. - 2024-11-10T18:50:47.197000+00:00 +In summary, the OPR protocol represents a groundbreaking development in the realm of Lightning payments, addressing critical issues of scalability, security, and user accessibility. By facilitating rapid, off-chain payment resolutions and introducing mechanisms to deter dishonest behavior, the protocol offers a robust solution for enhancing the efficiency and reliability of cryptocurrency transactions. The detailed exploration of its technical underpinnings and potential impacts provided in the discussion underscores the protocol's viability as a transformative tool for the future of the Lightning Network. + 2024-11-14T20:52:41.355000+00:00 diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..69e8e0883 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Pluggable-Channel-Factories.xml @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ + + + 2 + Combined summary - Pluggable Channel Factories + 2024-11-15T02:26:12.035847+00:00 + + ZmnSCPxj 2024-11-14 15:04:03.807000+00:00 + + + renepickhardt 2024-11-14 12:45:29.445000+00:00 + + + ZmnSCPxj . 2024-11-11 16:24:40.356000+00:00 + + + + + python-feedgen + + 2 + Combined summary - Pluggable Channel Factories + 2024-11-15T02:26:12.035891+00:00 + + The discussion highlights the integration and potential challenges of implementing channel factories within the Lightning Network, emphasizing the necessity for plugins to monitor unilateral exits from these factories. It acknowledges that while the base node software will continue to monitor the blockchain for channels, the closure of a factory layer does not necessarily impede the operation of its hosted channels, which can still function directly onchain. However, the complexity arises when a factory's closure also leads to the termination of its channels, particularly in edge cases such as timeouts or forced shutdowns, necessitating a mechanism for the plugin to communicate with the base node software to disregard an in-factory channel. + +The conversation further explores the concept of generalizing gossip in the Lightning Network, proposing a method where nodes demonstrate shared control over onchain funds to validate their capability to host channels. This approach stems from the need to limit the size of the network's public channel announcements, ensuring they are backed by unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) to prevent spamming. The proposal suggests prioritizing this change in gossip protocol to facilitate the inclusion of channels within factories, though it is currently deemed out of scope in favor of focusing on the foundational protocol for channel factories. + +An alternative to traditional channel factories, termed "sidepools," is introduced, aiming to blend the benefits of onchain N=2 mechanisms with offchain N>2 mechanisms. This innovation allows for efficient liquidity management through "just-in-time" rebalancing, leveraging the reliability of public forwarding nodes and existing pathfinding algorithms without necessitating changes to the current gossip protocol. + +The email also reflects on the technical intricacies of developing "pluggable channel factories," which would allow for the seamless integration of offchain-hosted channels into the Lightning Network's existing node software. This includes addressing the complexities of managing channel states amidst the operational dynamics of channel factories, drawing parallels to the process of channel splicing. The proposed solution advocates for adapting splicing techniques, such as quiescing channels and transitioning between old and new factory states using modified commitment messages, to ensure the stability and functionality of channels within these factories. + 2024-11-14T15:04:03.807000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml index 013490165..40161105f 100644 --- a/static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/combined_A-Fast-Scalable-Protocol-For-Resolving-Lightning-Payments.xml @@ -2,15 +2,18 @@ 2 Combined summary - A Fast, Scalable Protocol For Resolving Lightning Payments - 2024-11-11T02:20:18.192150+00:00 + 2024-11-15T02:25:11.815179+00:00 - JohnLaw 2024-11-10 18:50:47.197000+00:00 + morehouse 2024-11-14 20:52:41.355000+00:00 - JohnLaw 2024-11-10 18:35:51.788000+00:00 + JohnLaw . 2024-11-10 18:50:47.197000+00:00 - harding 2024-11-10 18:03:56.191000+00:00 + JohnLaw . 2024-11-10 18:35:51.788000+00:00 + + + harding . 2024-11-10 18:03:56.191000+00:00 JohnLaw . 2024-11-10 00:06:59.715000+00:00 @@ -30,6 +33,7 @@ JohnLaw . 2024-10-31 22:50:15.637000+00:00 + @@ -43,17 +47,17 @@ 2 Combined summary - A Fast, Scalable Protocol For Resolving Lightning Payments - 2024-11-11T02:20:18.192263+00:00 - - The discourse around the Off-Chain Protocol Routing (OPR) system compared to the current Lightning Network reveals complexities in handling payment failures and vulnerabilities to attacks, such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) and probing. The OPR's approach to resolving Hash Time Locked Contracts (HTLCs) without adding to on-chain congestion introduces a trade-off between latency and node availability. A specific attack scenario detailed involves a node, referred to as Bob, suffering financial loss due to a DoS attack that disrupts communication, highlighting potential for exploitation by malicious actors aiming to profit from induced network failures. This underscores the necessity for OPR nodes to fortify against IP-layer attacks to maintain payment reliability, albeit with concerns over rising operational costs potentially leading to centralization. + 2024-11-15T02:25:11.815256+00:00 + + The Offchain Payment Resolution (OPR) protocol emerges as a significant advancement in cryptocurrency transaction protocols, specifically addressing the challenges and limitations inherent in the current lightning network system. The protocol is designed to ensure that all transactions, regardless of size, can be resolved swiftly and off-chain, thereby eliminating the need for costly on-chain transactions. This approach not only enhances the scalability of the network by reducing its on-chain footprint but also allows users to engage in transactions without the need for constant online presence, marking a notable improvement over existing systems. -Further analysis delves into economic incentives structured within the OPR protocol to discourage dishonest behavior through a griefer-penalized mechanism. This mechanism aims to secure transactions by ensuring mutual agreement on payment outcomes before funds can be reclaimed from a burn output, promoting integrity among participants. Conversely, the protocol suggests a novel method of managing HTLC resolutions by allowing cooperative channel closure even in cases of disputed HTLCs, a departure from current protocols that mandate force closures, thereby mitigating self-griefing costs associated with disputes. +A key feature of the OPR protocol is its security mechanism, which operates on a principle that discourages dishonest behavior through a griefer-penalized system. In this system, any attempt by a participant to exploit the protocol results in a loss proportional to the intended damage, effectively deterring malicious actions and ensuring secure transactions among parties. This is a departure from traditional trust-based systems, where users risk theft, or trust-free protocols, which do not penalize dishonesty as effectively. -The discussion also touches on the broader implications of adopting OPR, including its potential to streamline small-scale transactions by eliminating the need for on-chain resolution, thus enhancing scalability and user experience. The introduction of conditional fees for transaction attempts, regardless of success, is proposed as a solution to disincentivize flood attacks using probes. However, this measure raises concerns about increased routing costs and the economic viability of the OPR system, especially when juxtaposed with the current fee structures of the Lightning Network. +The protocol also introduces innovative solutions to operational risks, such as disagreements over Hash Time-Locked Contracts (HTLCs) or channel partner failures. These include the use of synchronized clocks and time-stamped logs for hash preimages, enhancing the accuracy and reliability of transaction resolutions. Despite these advancements, the protocol acknowledges potential fund losses due to node failures and attempts to mitigate this risk through increased routing fees, highlighting a balanced approach to operational efficiency and security. -Addressing operational risks, the conversation emphasizes the importance of implementing synchronized clocks and time-stamped logs to accurately assess transaction outcomes amidst network inconsistencies. Although this approach aims to mitigate fund loss due to node or communication failures, it acknowledges the inherent challenges in distinguishing between genuine network delays and potential malicious actions, underscoring the intricate balance required between security, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness in off-chain payment systems. +Moreover, the OPR protocol's compatibility with technologies like channel factories and hierarchical channels suggests promising avenues for further scalability and usability enhancements. It supports immediate payment resolution, significantly improving the user experience, especially for casual users who may not maintain a constant online presence. -In conclusion, the dialogue surrounding the OPR protocol sheds light on its innovative contributions towards improving the scalability and adoption of lightning network transactions by facilitating quicker, safer off-chain payments. Despite the highlighted challenges and trade-offs, such as the need for heightened security measures and potential increases in operational costs, the overall sentiment leans towards optimism regarding the protocol's ability to advance cryptocurrency transactions, particularly in enhancing the user experience for casual participants in the lightning network. - 2024-11-10T18:50:47.197000+00:00 +In summary, the OPR protocol represents a groundbreaking development in the realm of Lightning payments, addressing critical issues of scalability, security, and user accessibility. By facilitating rapid, off-chain payment resolutions and introducing mechanisms to deter dishonest behavior, the protocol offers a robust solution for enhancing the efficiency and reliability of cryptocurrency transactions. The detailed exploration of its technical underpinnings and potential impacts provided in the discussion underscores the protocol's viability as a transformative tool for the future of the Lightning Network. + 2024-11-14T20:52:41.355000+00:00