diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml index f1e844d39..fd33f1869 100644 --- a/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml @@ -2,24 +2,34 @@ 2 Combined summary - Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki - 2024-12-07T02:32:15.878133+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:45:19.595748+00:00 + + Yuval Kogman 2024-12-07 01:42:00+00:00 + + + /dev /fd0 2024-12-07 00:29:00+00:00 + Jonas Nick 2024-12-06 21:45:00+00:00 /dev /fd 2024-11-29 14:08:00+00:00 + + python-feedgen 2 Combined summary - Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki - 2024-12-07T02:32:15.878173+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:45:19.595816+00:00 - The email initiates a dialogue concerning the current methodology employed for building consensus around Bitcoin covenant proposals, specifically critiquing the format modeled after the SegWit support page. It suggests that this approach inadequately facilitates rough consensus as per the guidelines of RFC 7282, which it recommends for a comprehensive understanding of consensus-building principles. The sender proposes significant modifications to enhance the process: firstly, by advocating for the separation of technical evaluation from community support, arguing that current ratings presuppose levels of support that could lead to biased outcomes. Secondly, it stresses the necessity of providing reasons for objections, recommending that each negative assessment be accompanied by detailed documentation of the concerns raised. This adjustment aims to foster constructive debate and more informed decision-making within the community. Lastly, the suggestion to add links to corresponding draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) for all opcodes listed aims to offer a solid foundation for technical evaluations. + The email discussions revolve around the methodology for achieving consensus within the Bitcoin development community, particularly concerning covenant proposals and the SegWit support page. There is a pointed critique of the current system used to gauge community support and technical evaluation, suggesting that it falls short of fostering genuine consensus as outlined in RFC 7282. The critique highlights a misalignment between the approach taken on the SegWit support page and effective consensus-building principles. Specifically, the use of categories like "Deficient" and "Wanting," which presuppose community support levels, is seen as problematic. This method could inadvertently influence the outcome of proposals, leading to premature judgments rather than an unbiased assessment. To address these concerns, the email proposes eliminating such categories to allow for a more open evaluation process. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for transparency and detailed justification of objections, suggesting that negative evaluations be linked to comprehensive justifications covering technical shortcomings, potential for adoption, and decentralization implications. + +In parallel, there's an initiative underway to compile developer opinions on various covenant proposals through a draft Bitcoin wiki page. This effort aims to replicate the SegWit page's consensus-building approach for soft forks. Contributors are encouraged to add relevant opcodes and their insights to the [Bitcoin Wiki](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Covenants_support), with an emphasis on the importance of linking to Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) drafts. Such links are deemed critical for providing context and clarity to technical evaluations. A notable mention in this context is the proposal for OP_CTV, highlighted through a presentation link ([Rationale for OP_CTV](https://notes.dunst.be/slide//2/slide/view/Ekky-cAegV9dSOaNOjH9TStNOmAnrhDDc9hxHlmRs5M/embed/present/)), which outlines its potential benefits for pools with covenants and joinstr implementations. -In a broader context, the email mentions the creation of a draft Bitcoin wiki page intended to compile developer insights on various covenant proposals. This initiative seeks to replicate the SegWit page's success in gathering support for soft forks related to Bitcoin's development. The wiki page, open for contributions from developers, is designed to be a platform for sharing opinions and technical evaluations. Developers are encouraged to list relevant opcodes, add their GitHub usernames, and articulate their positions on proposals such as OP_CheckTemplateVerify (OP_CTV). The latter is singled out for its potential benefits, including enhancing pools with covenants and improving implementations like coinjoin. A linked presentation provides further rationale for supporting OP_CTV, underlining its significance in the broader conversation about Bitcoin's evolution. The sender underscores the collaborative nature of this endeavor, aiming to simplify the consensus process towards the next soft fork and highlighting the collective work needed to identify and agree upon the most advantageous proposals. - 2024-12-06T21:45:00+00:00 +The collective effort to refine and agree upon the most beneficial proposals for the next soft fork is underscored, marking a significant push towards simplifying and enhancing the consensus-building process within the Bitcoin development community. This includes a reevaluation of how community support and technical merit are assessed, advocating for a more transparent, inclusive, and reasoned pathway toward achieving consensus. + 2024-12-07T01:42:00+00:00 diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m44c625ff2928ddc0b2736b8b09abb218766c91cd_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m44c625ff2928ddc0b2736b8b09abb218766c91cd_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aaba8c2a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m44c625ff2928ddc0b2736b8b09abb218766c91cd_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + + 1 + Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki + 2024-12-08T02:45:07.443214+00:00 + + /dev /fd0 2024-12-07 00:29:00+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki + 2024-12-08T02:45:07.443250+00:00 + + In the recent communication on the Bitcoin Development Mailing List, Yuval Kogman outlined updates and clarifications regarding the process for sharing opinions on opcode proposals within the community. He highlighted that developers have seven options to express their stance on a proposal, with only two options indicating community support. These options allow developers to acknowledge a proposal as 'prefer' or 'acceptable', or to reject it with 'no'. Modifications have been made to three categories to refine their definitions, including removing the association of community support from the 'no' option and rephrasing 'prefer' and 'evaluating'. + +Kogman also addressed the concerns about the potential impact of eliminating some categories, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the integrity of the existing system to avoid disruptions. He acknowledged the diverse perspectives within the Bitcoin developer community and advocated for allowing individuals the freedom to express their views, even if they choose to label a proposal as 'deficient' or 'wanting'. This approach underscores the value placed on diverse input and the desire to accommodate varying degrees of caution and scrutiny among contributors. + +Furthermore, Kogman announced the upcoming addition of a feature that will enable contributors to include links to their rationale behind opinions on opcodes, enhancing transparency and understanding within the community. This update was previously mentioned on social media but had not been communicated through the mailing list. In addition to these procedural updates, Kogman has facilitated the inclusion of links to Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) drafts for all opcodes, ensuring that detailed information is accessible for thorough evaluation and discussion. This effort demonstrates a commitment to fostering informed participation and comprehensive review processes within the Bitcoin development ecosystem. + 2024-12-07T00:29:00+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m9514dfbbdecae448769fbbfb1698b1ab047de85b_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m9514dfbbdecae448769fbbfb1698b1ab047de85b_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..178e09282 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m9514dfbbdecae448769fbbfb1698b1ab047de85b_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ + + + 1 + Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki + 2024-12-08T02:44:58.648154+00:00 + + Yuval Kogman 2024-12-07 01:42:00+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki + 2024-12-08T02:44:58.648188+00:00 + + The communication outlines a nuanced perspective on the process of gauging developer sentiments and community support for proposals within a technical or development environment. It highlights the complexity of accurately capturing a developer's technical assessment and their speculation on community support through a simplified voting system. The proposed system attempts to categorize opinions along two independent dimensions: technical merit and perceived community support. These dimensions are further broken down into options such as "no," "weak," "acceptable," and "prefer" for technical merit, alongside "sufficient" and "insufficient" for gauging community backing. + +A significant issue identified is the conflation of these two distinct aspects into a single evaluative framework, which can lead to confusion and misinterpretation. For instance, a developer might personally favor a proposal but doubt its community support, a situation that the current model handles inadequately by merging these considerations. To address this, an expanded model is suggested that allows developers to abstain from commenting on community support while still expressing a technical opinion. This model introduces placeholders (represented by the symbol "⊥") for situations where a developer chooses not to, or cannot, speculate on community support or evaluate the technical merits, aiming to provide a more flexible and expressive framework. + +Furthermore, the discussion references the Keynesian beauty contest ([Keynesian beauty contest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Keynesian_beauty_contest)), drawing parallels to the challenges of speculative evaluation based on perceptions of others' opinions. This analogy underlines the inherent difficulties in creating a fully ordered or objective ranking system based on subjective evaluations that involve speculation about collective opinions. The critique extends to the use of a color scheme in the existing system, which could inadvertently suggest a clarity or hierarchy that the nuanced nature of opinion and support does not warrant. + +Overall, the message underscores the complexity of decision-making processes in collaborative environments and suggests that a more nuanced approach, which allows participants to express a range of opinions without forcing a binary choice, could be beneficial. This would acknowledge the layered reality of technical evaluations and community dynamics, reducing potential ambiguities and fostering a more inclusive and accurate reflection of diverse perspectives. + 2024-12-07T01:42:00+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml index f1e844d39..fd33f1869 100644 --- a/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml +++ b/static/bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/combined_Covenants-Support-Bitcoin-Wiki.xml @@ -2,24 +2,34 @@ 2 Combined summary - Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki - 2024-12-07T02:32:15.878133+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:45:19.595748+00:00 + + Yuval Kogman 2024-12-07 01:42:00+00:00 + + + /dev /fd0 2024-12-07 00:29:00+00:00 + Jonas Nick 2024-12-06 21:45:00+00:00 /dev /fd 2024-11-29 14:08:00+00:00 + + python-feedgen 2 Combined summary - Covenants Support - Bitcoin Wiki - 2024-12-07T02:32:15.878173+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:45:19.595816+00:00 - The email initiates a dialogue concerning the current methodology employed for building consensus around Bitcoin covenant proposals, specifically critiquing the format modeled after the SegWit support page. It suggests that this approach inadequately facilitates rough consensus as per the guidelines of RFC 7282, which it recommends for a comprehensive understanding of consensus-building principles. The sender proposes significant modifications to enhance the process: firstly, by advocating for the separation of technical evaluation from community support, arguing that current ratings presuppose levels of support that could lead to biased outcomes. Secondly, it stresses the necessity of providing reasons for objections, recommending that each negative assessment be accompanied by detailed documentation of the concerns raised. This adjustment aims to foster constructive debate and more informed decision-making within the community. Lastly, the suggestion to add links to corresponding draft Bitcoin Improvement Proposals (BIPs) for all opcodes listed aims to offer a solid foundation for technical evaluations. + The email discussions revolve around the methodology for achieving consensus within the Bitcoin development community, particularly concerning covenant proposals and the SegWit support page. There is a pointed critique of the current system used to gauge community support and technical evaluation, suggesting that it falls short of fostering genuine consensus as outlined in RFC 7282. The critique highlights a misalignment between the approach taken on the SegWit support page and effective consensus-building principles. Specifically, the use of categories like "Deficient" and "Wanting," which presuppose community support levels, is seen as problematic. This method could inadvertently influence the outcome of proposals, leading to premature judgments rather than an unbiased assessment. To address these concerns, the email proposes eliminating such categories to allow for a more open evaluation process. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for transparency and detailed justification of objections, suggesting that negative evaluations be linked to comprehensive justifications covering technical shortcomings, potential for adoption, and decentralization implications. + +In parallel, there's an initiative underway to compile developer opinions on various covenant proposals through a draft Bitcoin wiki page. This effort aims to replicate the SegWit page's consensus-building approach for soft forks. Contributors are encouraged to add relevant opcodes and their insights to the [Bitcoin Wiki](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Covenants_support), with an emphasis on the importance of linking to Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) drafts. Such links are deemed critical for providing context and clarity to technical evaluations. A notable mention in this context is the proposal for OP_CTV, highlighted through a presentation link ([Rationale for OP_CTV](https://notes.dunst.be/slide//2/slide/view/Ekky-cAegV9dSOaNOjH9TStNOmAnrhDDc9hxHlmRs5M/embed/present/)), which outlines its potential benefits for pools with covenants and joinstr implementations. -In a broader context, the email mentions the creation of a draft Bitcoin wiki page intended to compile developer insights on various covenant proposals. This initiative seeks to replicate the SegWit page's success in gathering support for soft forks related to Bitcoin's development. The wiki page, open for contributions from developers, is designed to be a platform for sharing opinions and technical evaluations. Developers are encouraged to list relevant opcodes, add their GitHub usernames, and articulate their positions on proposals such as OP_CheckTemplateVerify (OP_CTV). The latter is singled out for its potential benefits, including enhancing pools with covenants and improving implementations like coinjoin. A linked presentation provides further rationale for supporting OP_CTV, underlining its significance in the broader conversation about Bitcoin's evolution. The sender underscores the collaborative nature of this endeavor, aiming to simplify the consensus process towards the next soft fork and highlighting the collective work needed to identify and agree upon the most advantageous proposals. - 2024-12-06T21:45:00+00:00 +The collective effort to refine and agree upon the most beneficial proposals for the next soft fork is underscored, marking a significant push towards simplifying and enhancing the consensus-building process within the Bitcoin development community. This includes a reevaluation of how community support and technical merit are assessed, advocating for a more transparent, inclusive, and reasoned pathway toward achieving consensus. + 2024-12-07T01:42:00+00:00 diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3736_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3736_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ee7d5c54a --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3736_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ + + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:42:21.042161+00:00 + + jungly 2024-12-07 07:32:41.167000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:42:21.042196+00:00 + + The discussion revolves around the innovative approach of managing payouts and fees between Mining Service Providers (MSPs) and miners within the context of blockchain mining, specifically focusing on Bitcoin. MSPs play a crucial role by estimating the hashrate produced by their affiliated miners and subsequently creating Deferred Payment Contracts (DLCs) for them. These contracts ensure that miners are compensated upfront for their computational contributions, with the condition that they meet the agreed upon hashrate by the time the contract expires. The payment process involves MSPs disbursing a predetermined amount of Bitcoin to each miner, which is calculated based on the expected inflow of funds from mining pools like Radpool's Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS) system. However, this model introduces a financial risk for MSPs since they pay out miners before receiving any actual payout from the pool. To mitigate this risk and ensure profitability, MSPs adjust the payment to miners to be slightly less than the anticipated return from the pool, effectively creating a margin or "fee" that compensates them for their risk. + +Radpool's attempt to decentralize Fixed Pay Per Share (FPPS) through this model highlights a shift towards minimizing central authority control in mining operations. The described mathematical model emphasizes deterministic outflows to miners against the stochastic nature of pool rewards, aiming to provide MSPs with a framework to calculate a safe hashrate commitment that balances their BTC outlay with an acceptable rate of return. + +Furthermore, the concept of zero fees for miners is introduced as a theoretical advantage for miners who also operate as their own MSP. In this scenario, miners can essentially bypass traditional fee structures by self-financing their operations. The difference between the inflow from the pool and the outflow to themselves remains within their control, allowing them to mine without incurring conventional fees, provided they have the necessary capital upfront. This self-sustaining setup challenges the existing centralized FPPS systems and proposes a more autonomous and potentially cost-effective mining solution. + +Lastly, the author expresses openness to sharing the MSP risk model for further review, indicating a collaborative effort toward refining and adopting this decentralized payout mechanism within the Bitcoin mining ecosystem. + 2024-12-07T07:32:41.167000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3737_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3737_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9d418820f --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3737_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml @@ -0,0 +1,20 @@ + + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:42:09.524310+00:00 + + jungly 2024-12-07 07:46:54.347000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:42:09.524343+00:00 + + The ongoing discussions about Radpool's method of distributing rewards have brought up concerns regarding the absence of a consensus mechanism. Contrary to these debates, Radpool does achieve consensus on the distribution of shares and rewards among miners. However, it accomplishes this without relying on the traditional Nakamoto consensus mechanism typically used at the share chain level. Instead, Radpool simplifies the process by treating it as a Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus problem with a known membership base. This approach allows Radpool to utilize any standard BFT consensus solution available. + +In the development of Radpool, a decision was made to select the simplest BFT consensus solution to implement, despite its potential drawbacks in terms of communication complexity. This choice was made with the understanding that a more efficient BFT system could be adopted in the future to address scalability issues should they arise. This strategic decision underscores Radpool's flexible approach to its infrastructure, prioritizing a straightforward initial design with the option for optimization based on future needs and challenges. + 2024-12-07T07:46:54.347000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3739_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3739_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..54b4a9c6f --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3739_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:42:02.735384+00:00 + + mcelrath 2024-12-07 13:41:54.842000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:42:02.735447+00:00 + + In the discussion about the complexities of implementing a fair payment system within a decentralized mining protocol, several key challenges are identified, emphasizing the importance of consensus and transparency among Mining Service Providers (MSPs). The core issue revolves around the necessity for MSPs to agree on the division of shares and the rate at which these shares are contributed, which is crucial for determining the correct payment distribution. This requires a mechanism by which MSPs can prove their hash rate contribution to one another, a solution that remains unspecified. Without such a proof, the system risks becoming unmanageable due to the excessively high message rate that would result from broadcasting all minor shares. + +Furthermore, the system under scrutiny appears to allow MSPs to act as centralized pools for their miners without any effective means of verifying the hash rate claimed by the MSP. This lack of accountability enables MSPs to potentially deceive individual miners regarding their actual hash rate contributions. Although this model may offer the benefit of reducing variance in mining outcomes, it introduces significant drawbacks compared to existing protocols like OCEAN with DATUM, notably the increased risk of transaction censorship given MSPs' role in block creation and the absence of direct accountability of miners to their MSPs. + +The critique suggests that while the proposed system aims to improve upon the current state of affairs by mitigating variance, it ultimately represents a regression in terms of transparency and trustworthiness relative to other models, particularly concerning the potential for MSP manipulation and lack of miner oversight. The unresolved questions highlight the need for further clarification and development to address these fundamental issues. + 2024-12-07T13:41:54.842000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3740_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3740_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml new file mode 100644 index 000000000..eefdca702 --- /dev/null +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/3740_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ + + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:41:50.878620+00:00 + + jungly 2024-12-07 17:22:11.992000+00:00 + + python-feedgen + + 1 + Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts + 2024-12-08T02:41:50.878659+00:00 + + The discussion focuses on the intricacies of managing payments within a network of Mining Service Providers (MSPs) through FROST signatures, emphasizing the necessity for consensus among MSPs regarding share contributions and message/share rates. The foundation of this system lies in the reliable broadcast to agreement reduction, ensuring that once MSPs have consistently replicated databases of shares via echo broadcast, they can accurately calculate owed amounts. This process eliminates the need for nakamoto consensus while addressing rate-limiting concerns by allowing each MSP to adjust mining difficulty and implement protective measures against potential DDoS attacks from other MSPs. Moreover, it's critical for MSPs to demonstrate their hash rate to maintain network integrity, despite challenges associated with broadcasting small shares due to high message rates. + +Further elaboration reveals a mechanism for verifying share ownership, as detailed at [Radpool](https://www.radpool.xyz/1/stratum.html_verifiable_share_ownership), which enables MSPs to identify shares' origins, whether from individual miners or other MSPs. This system allows for the calculation and validation of shares tied to specific miners and block templates created by MSPs. However, this approach introduces potential drawbacks compared to existing models, such as increased transaction censorship risks and reduced accountability for miners towards their MSPs, marking a regression from previous standards like OCEAN with DATUM. + +Contrarily, the structure proposed offers a novel perspective by decentralizing block template production across competing MSPs, rather than centralizing it under one entity. This competition encourages MSPs to cater to miner preferences, including support for sv2/datum, fostering greater decentralization. This model not only mitigates variance but also promotes a more distributed approach to template generation among multiple MSPs, enhancing the overall framework's resilience and appealing to a wider array of miners seeking diverse technological solutions. + 2024-12-07T17:22:11.992000+00:00 + + diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml index 56bf8274e..39a9fa68f 100644 --- a/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Dec_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml @@ -2,9 +2,21 @@ 2 Combined summary - Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts - 2024-12-07T02:28:39.507700+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:42:36.414754+00:00 - marathon-gary 2024-12-06 19:28:52.277000+00:00 + jungly 2024-12-07 17:22:11.992000+00:00 + + + mcelrath 2024-12-07 13:41:54.842000+00:00 + + + jungly 2024-12-07 07:46:54.347000+00:00 + + + jungly 2024-12-07 07:32:41.167000+00:00 + + + marathongary . 2024-12-06 19:28:52.277000+00:00 jungly . 2024-12-05 22:25:36.129000+00:00 @@ -57,6 +69,10 @@ jungly . 2024-11-16 14:58:04.341000+00:00 + + + + @@ -79,21 +95,15 @@ 2 Combined summary - Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts - 2024-12-07T02:28:39.507820+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:42:36.414900+00:00 - The discussion explores the innovative approaches being taken within the realm of digital asset management and mining, focusing on the decentralization and efficiency improvements through various proposed mechanisms. A notable innovation is the introduction of Managed Service Providers (MSPs) operating independently from traditional threshold signature schemes. This model, facilitated by an echo-broadcast system, allows MSPs to contribute shares actively while ensuring integrity through a rigorous compliance mechanism that promptly removes any MSP exhibiting malfeasance. This method introduces a more versatile and cost-effective alternative for miners by potentially reducing operational costs and allowing for the creation of personalized block templates, highlighting a shift towards decentralization. - -Radpool presents a novel mining pool framework that diverges from the conventional centralized model by forming a syndicate of MSPs. These MSPs maintain a consistent database replica and employ Threshold Signature Schemes (TSS) for signing payouts, offering a unique incentive structure while preserving the operational familiarity for miners. The architecture of Radpool ensures that difficulty adjustments are managed locally by each MSP, tailored to their respective miners, which mirrors the incentive and operational structure found within centralized mining pools. This approach aims to ease the transition process for miners and MSPs to a decentralized model, raising questions about the unique benefits Radpool offers to MSPs compared to current mining configurations. - -The introduction of a decentralized mining pool architecture where miners are not required to conform to a uniform difficulty target represents a significant paradigm shift. This model maintains the core principle of difficulty adjustment akin to centralized pools but enhances security and autonomy through decentralization. The Radpool system replaces the centralized entity with a consortium of MSPs, which collectively maintain a robust database and are responsible for generating independent block templates. This decentralization ensures fair reward distribution among participants based on their contributions, maintaining operational familiarity while promising an efficient, secure, and equitable mining ecosystem. - -A critical aspect of MSP operation involves the validation of shares, particularly those downstream, through a broadcasting mechanism that enables collective verification of share authenticity. This process underscores the importance of consensus among MSPs on setting a difficulty target, fostering an environment of cooperation and mutual verification. Furthermore, in MSP to miner communication, the emphasis is placed on maintaining integrity in the mining process through meticulous validation of Proof of Work (PoW) shares. This includes implementing rate-limiting share broadcast to prevent network flooding and ensuring only valid PoW shares are circulated among MSPs. This system provides a structured yet decentralized operation, highlighting strategies employed to maintain operational integrity and security within the network. + The discussion centers on the innovative approach to decentralized mining pools through Radpool, aiming to address the challenges posed by traditional centralized mining pools. Radpool's model involves a network of Mining Service Providers (MSPs) that decentralizes block template generation, offering a solution to combat centralization in the mining sector. This system empowers MSPs to independently create block templates and manage stratum servers, providing miners with the autonomy to construct their own templates if desired. Utilizing Free Open Source Software (FOSS) for node implementation ensures flexibility and choice for MSPs within the Radpool framework. -Addressing scalability and security concerns is paramount, with the implementation of difficulty adjustment mechanisms and rate-limiting for Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) messages being crucial for preventing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and ensuring network stability. The exploration into Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) broadcast as a means to achieve consistency without needing a traditional consensus highlights strategic decisions in blockchain protocol development, emphasizing the importance of tailored solutions for varying network configurations. +Radpool introduces a unique payout mechanism that employs Discreet Log Contracts (DLCs) to remunerate miners based on their hash rate contributions at predetermined intervals. This arrangement allows MSPs to fund these contracts, which are then settled using FROST threshold signatures. The model ensures reliable payouts to miners by incorporating safeguards against unilateral withdrawals by MSPs, thereby maintaining stability and trust within the ecosystem. By offering a yield-generating opportunity for entities capable of funding DLC contracts to function as MSPs, Radpool creates a competitive environment that benefits both miners and MSPs. -The potential collaboration or merging efforts between Braidpool and Radpool, given their foundational similarities, opens avenues for integrating shared components such as FROST and DLCs. The discussion extends to the operational differences between these proposals, addressing consensus requirements, payout systems, and network architecture, showcasing a comprehensive comparison that underlines the nuanced complexities in designing decentralized mining pools. +Positioned between centralized and peer-to-peer (p2p) pools, Radpool leverages its design to reduce variance for miners and enhance yield potentials for MSPs, contributing to a healthy competitive landscape for pool fees. This encourages network growth through a classic network effect, presenting an attractive proposition for participants across the mining ecosystem. Key features facilitating this include the decentralization of block template construction, transparent share accounting, and mechanisms enabling unilateral exits for both miners and MSPs, ensuring seamless integration for users familiar with centralized mining operations. -In summary, the dialogue encapsulates a broad spectrum of ideas and proposals aimed at enhancing the efficiency, security, and decentralization of digital asset mining. Through innovative mechanisms like echo-broadcast systems, decentralized mining pool architectures, and advanced share validation processes, these discussions illuminate the path toward more autonomous and miner-centric operations. The emphasis on collaboration, combined with a thorough examination of operational mechanics and philosophical distinctions, reflects a deep engagement with the challenges and opportunities presented by the evolving landscape of blockchain technology and cryptocurrency mining. - 2024-12-06T19:28:52.277000+00:00 +Currently, the development focus is on the FROST Federation, which serves as the foundation for the MSP federation, alongside the initial stages of implementing DLC contracts using Rust-DLC. The community engagement via Discord aims to foster collaboration, inviting discussions on potential vulnerabilities and contributions to further refine the Radpool project. + 2024-12-07T17:22:11.992000+00:00 diff --git a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml index 56bf8274e..39a9fa68f 100644 --- a/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml +++ b/static/delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/combined_Radpool-Decentralised-Mining-Pool-With-Futures-Contracts-For-Payouts.xml @@ -2,9 +2,21 @@ 2 Combined summary - Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts - 2024-12-07T02:28:39.507700+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:42:36.414754+00:00 - marathon-gary 2024-12-06 19:28:52.277000+00:00 + jungly 2024-12-07 17:22:11.992000+00:00 + + + mcelrath 2024-12-07 13:41:54.842000+00:00 + + + jungly 2024-12-07 07:46:54.347000+00:00 + + + jungly 2024-12-07 07:32:41.167000+00:00 + + + marathongary . 2024-12-06 19:28:52.277000+00:00 jungly . 2024-12-05 22:25:36.129000+00:00 @@ -57,6 +69,10 @@ jungly . 2024-11-16 14:58:04.341000+00:00 + + + + @@ -79,21 +95,15 @@ 2 Combined summary - Radpool: Decentralised Mining Pool With Futures Contracts For Payouts - 2024-12-07T02:28:39.507820+00:00 + 2024-12-08T02:42:36.414900+00:00 - The discussion explores the innovative approaches being taken within the realm of digital asset management and mining, focusing on the decentralization and efficiency improvements through various proposed mechanisms. A notable innovation is the introduction of Managed Service Providers (MSPs) operating independently from traditional threshold signature schemes. This model, facilitated by an echo-broadcast system, allows MSPs to contribute shares actively while ensuring integrity through a rigorous compliance mechanism that promptly removes any MSP exhibiting malfeasance. This method introduces a more versatile and cost-effective alternative for miners by potentially reducing operational costs and allowing for the creation of personalized block templates, highlighting a shift towards decentralization. - -Radpool presents a novel mining pool framework that diverges from the conventional centralized model by forming a syndicate of MSPs. These MSPs maintain a consistent database replica and employ Threshold Signature Schemes (TSS) for signing payouts, offering a unique incentive structure while preserving the operational familiarity for miners. The architecture of Radpool ensures that difficulty adjustments are managed locally by each MSP, tailored to their respective miners, which mirrors the incentive and operational structure found within centralized mining pools. This approach aims to ease the transition process for miners and MSPs to a decentralized model, raising questions about the unique benefits Radpool offers to MSPs compared to current mining configurations. - -The introduction of a decentralized mining pool architecture where miners are not required to conform to a uniform difficulty target represents a significant paradigm shift. This model maintains the core principle of difficulty adjustment akin to centralized pools but enhances security and autonomy through decentralization. The Radpool system replaces the centralized entity with a consortium of MSPs, which collectively maintain a robust database and are responsible for generating independent block templates. This decentralization ensures fair reward distribution among participants based on their contributions, maintaining operational familiarity while promising an efficient, secure, and equitable mining ecosystem. - -A critical aspect of MSP operation involves the validation of shares, particularly those downstream, through a broadcasting mechanism that enables collective verification of share authenticity. This process underscores the importance of consensus among MSPs on setting a difficulty target, fostering an environment of cooperation and mutual verification. Furthermore, in MSP to miner communication, the emphasis is placed on maintaining integrity in the mining process through meticulous validation of Proof of Work (PoW) shares. This includes implementing rate-limiting share broadcast to prevent network flooding and ensuring only valid PoW shares are circulated among MSPs. This system provides a structured yet decentralized operation, highlighting strategies employed to maintain operational integrity and security within the network. + The discussion centers on the innovative approach to decentralized mining pools through Radpool, aiming to address the challenges posed by traditional centralized mining pools. Radpool's model involves a network of Mining Service Providers (MSPs) that decentralizes block template generation, offering a solution to combat centralization in the mining sector. This system empowers MSPs to independently create block templates and manage stratum servers, providing miners with the autonomy to construct their own templates if desired. Utilizing Free Open Source Software (FOSS) for node implementation ensures flexibility and choice for MSPs within the Radpool framework. -Addressing scalability and security concerns is paramount, with the implementation of difficulty adjustment mechanisms and rate-limiting for Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) messages being crucial for preventing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks and ensuring network stability. The exploration into Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) broadcast as a means to achieve consistency without needing a traditional consensus highlights strategic decisions in blockchain protocol development, emphasizing the importance of tailored solutions for varying network configurations. +Radpool introduces a unique payout mechanism that employs Discreet Log Contracts (DLCs) to remunerate miners based on their hash rate contributions at predetermined intervals. This arrangement allows MSPs to fund these contracts, which are then settled using FROST threshold signatures. The model ensures reliable payouts to miners by incorporating safeguards against unilateral withdrawals by MSPs, thereby maintaining stability and trust within the ecosystem. By offering a yield-generating opportunity for entities capable of funding DLC contracts to function as MSPs, Radpool creates a competitive environment that benefits both miners and MSPs. -The potential collaboration or merging efforts between Braidpool and Radpool, given their foundational similarities, opens avenues for integrating shared components such as FROST and DLCs. The discussion extends to the operational differences between these proposals, addressing consensus requirements, payout systems, and network architecture, showcasing a comprehensive comparison that underlines the nuanced complexities in designing decentralized mining pools. +Positioned between centralized and peer-to-peer (p2p) pools, Radpool leverages its design to reduce variance for miners and enhance yield potentials for MSPs, contributing to a healthy competitive landscape for pool fees. This encourages network growth through a classic network effect, presenting an attractive proposition for participants across the mining ecosystem. Key features facilitating this include the decentralization of block template construction, transparent share accounting, and mechanisms enabling unilateral exits for both miners and MSPs, ensuring seamless integration for users familiar with centralized mining operations. -In summary, the dialogue encapsulates a broad spectrum of ideas and proposals aimed at enhancing the efficiency, security, and decentralization of digital asset mining. Through innovative mechanisms like echo-broadcast systems, decentralized mining pool architectures, and advanced share validation processes, these discussions illuminate the path toward more autonomous and miner-centric operations. The emphasis on collaboration, combined with a thorough examination of operational mechanics and philosophical distinctions, reflects a deep engagement with the challenges and opportunities presented by the evolving landscape of blockchain technology and cryptocurrency mining. - 2024-12-06T19:28:52.277000+00:00 +Currently, the development focus is on the FROST Federation, which serves as the foundation for the MSP federation, alongside the initial stages of implementing DLC contracts using Rust-DLC. The community engagement via Discord aims to foster collaboration, inviting discussions on potential vulnerabilities and contributions to further refine the Radpool project. + 2024-12-07T17:22:11.992000+00:00