acknowledgments.tex

\section{Acknowledgements}

The authors wish to thank Kostis Karantias for his valuable contributions with respect to
the design of the protocol that uses Merkle Mountain Ranges to build infix proofs on top
of velvet suffix proofs.

We also thank Tristan Nemoz and Alexei Zamyatin
for fruitful discussions pertaining to the interplay of
velvet forks and FlyClient.
After the first version of this paper was
published~\cite{velvet-nipopows-old}, where
we introduced chainsewing attacks against NIPoPoWs,
they observed that similar attacks
might apply to FlyClient too.
An in depth exploration of these attacks and potential mitigations
is put forth in their follow up work~\cite{velvet-flyclient}.
Concurrently, we extended the present paper to include
our combined attack involving both suppression and chainsewing,
which amounts to a more fundamental attack against FlyClient,
as its analysis highlights the necessity for stricter adversarial bounds
and the fact that some of the recommended mitigations are insufficient.