testo_di_prova4.txt

meaningfully employ the concept of indifference, we say that someone is indifferent between at least two objects. So, rather than saying that someone who is truth-indifferent is indifferent to the truth, we should at least say that she is indifferent between truth and falsehood. This way of putting it, however, is also problematic because truth and falsehood do not exist independently of truth-bearers, for example, beliefs. So we should say, it seems, that one is truth-indifferent to the extent that one has, as Quassim Cassam has recently put it, “a casual lack of concern about whether one’s beliefs have any basis in reality” (Cassam in press) or not. Cassam calls this attitude “epistemic insouciance,” and it is, arguably, one important form of truth-indifference. Epistemic insouciance, however, is not exactly what is required by B1. A person who is indifferent to whether her beliefs are true or false could, after all, avoid bullshitting by never communicating them to others.[22] Evidently, then, what matters here are not beliefs but communications.[23] B1 requires indifference to whether one’s communications are true or false.[24] Now, to say that a publisher is indifferent to whether his communications are true or false can mean different things. To see this, imagine a publisher who is considering publishing a story. He is doubtful about its truth. In one sense, then, he is truth-indifferent if he chooses to publish the story anyway. Let us refer to this type of truth-indifference as “truth-indifference 1.” Note, however, that our publisher might not be truth-indifferent in another sense. Suppose that he does consider his lack of conviction in the story’s truth as a reason for not publishing it but decides that, all things considered, it would be for the best to publish it anyway. In that case, there is a sense in which the publisher is not truth-indifferent—call it “truth-indifference 2.” He recognizes, after all, that the truth or falsehood of a story is a factor to be taken into account. Now, there is yet another sense in which our publisher can be truth-indifferent. Suppose he decides not to publish any stories he is doubtful about, and suppose, further, that he does this because he considers the truth of a story an important factor. He is, then, not truth-indifferent 1 or truth-indifferent 2. He may, however, be truth-indifferent in a further sense—call it “truth-indifference 3 ”—if he is only concerned with the truth of a story for instrumental reasons. A political regime might impose severe penalties for false reporting such that the publisher is forced to prioritize truth. He might, however, fail to see the intrinsic value of truth and would, if there were no penalties, not hesitate to publish any story whatsoever. Which of these three notions of truth-indifference is relevant in the context of B1? The answer is obvious: A story is fake news only if its publisher chooses to publish it despite his doubts about its truth because this is, all things considered, preferable for him to do. This is truth-indifference 1. It is irrelevant whether the publisher regards truth as a pro tanto reason for his decision (truth-indifference 2 ), and it is equally irrelevant whether he thinks that a story’s truth matters intrinsically (truth-indifference 3 ).[25] To confirm this, consider PIZZAGATE again. I assumed that the publishers were truth-indifferent 1. This feature is necessary because, had the publishers not been truth-indifferent 1, there would not have been any fake news story to begin with since they would not have decided to publish it. Now, let us imagine that the publishers were not truth-indifferent 2 and truth-indifferent 3. That is, they were concerned about the fact that their story was likely false, and they also regarded truth as an intrinsically desirable feature in a story. However, they decided to publish their story anyway because they judged that it was, all things considered, more important to fight (what they took to be) a reprehensible political candidate than to speak the truth. Adding these details evidently does not change our evaluation of the case. Even with these factors in the picture, PIZZAGATE remains, I believe, a paradigm case of fake news. To sum up, then, what is required by B1, that is, the truth-indifference condition for fake news, is that the story’s publisher decides to publish it despite there being doubts about its truth.\n\nBullshit Condition (B2) The verb “to deceive” is an achievement word (Ryle 1949/2009: 131ff.), unlike, for example, “to lie”. I have not deceived you unless you actually come to believe