From fbe0ea8795d4cd7642d9e93c0e97e530cefa292e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: rasmus-kirk Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2025 16:16:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] spelling error fix --- report/report.md | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/report/report.md b/report/report.md index b39f796..6be7299 100644 --- a/report/report.md +++ b/report/report.md @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ More concretely, imagine that Alice has today's Sudoku problem $X \in and wants to convince Bob without having to reveal the entire solution. She could then use a SNARK to generate a proof for Bob. To do this she must first encode the Sudoku verifier as a circuit $R_X$, then let $x$ represent public -inputs to the circtuit, such as today's Sudoku values/positions, etc, and then +inputs to the circuit, such as today's Sudoku values/positions, etc, and then give the SNARK prover the public inputs and her witness, $\SNARKProver(R_X, x, w) = \pi$. Finally she sends this proof, $\pi$, to Bob along with the public Sudoku verifying circuit, $R_X$, and he can check the proof and be @@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ to get security under weaker or stronger assumptions. Discrete Log problem is hard, the verifier is linear. - **FRI PCSs:** Also uses an untrusted setup, assumes secure one way functions exist. It has a higher constant overhead than PCSs based on the Discrete - Log assumption, but becuase it instead assumes that secure one-way functions + Log assumption, but because it instead assumes that secure one-way functions exist, you end up with a quantum secure PCS. A PCS allows a prover to prove to a verifier that a committed polynomial