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Currently, Tributary transactions bind to the genesis block. Under full asynchrony, a malicious 34% may produce two distinct chains (splitting the honest validators) and convince each 33% the other are faulty by:
Obtaining synchrony on a block on one chain
Collecting the relevant preprocess transactions
Placing them on the other chain, before synchrony has been obtained
Since the signing protocol hasn't been whitelisted yet, this will cause a fatal slash. If the preprocess transactions did bind to the tip block of their blockchain, the other blockchain would refuse to accept these transactions.
In general, a malicious 34% shouldn't be able to cause fatal slashes. While this requires asynchrony and can be argued unlikely, we should still fix this as it does allow a malicious 34% to cause fatal slashes.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
Currently, Tributary transactions bind to the genesis block. Under full asynchrony, a malicious 34% may produce two distinct chains (splitting the honest validators) and convince each 33% the other are faulty by:
Since the signing protocol hasn't been whitelisted yet, this will cause a fatal slash. If the preprocess transactions did bind to the tip block of their blockchain, the other blockchain would refuse to accept these transactions.
In general, a malicious 34% shouldn't be able to cause fatal slashes. While this requires asynchrony and can be argued unlikely, we should still fix this as it does allow a malicious 34% to cause fatal slashes.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: