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Blockchain & Cryptocurrency Research Topics
This document aims to compile together different efforts to work towards both applied and fundamental blockchain and cryptoeconomic research. The goal is to give a broad picture of the outstanding topics of research and current community efforts. The intention for this document is to be a central repository for those interested. Whether simple intellectual curiousity, or looking to get involved in research, here are areas where immediate contributions can be made to the ecosystem.
For those who wish to take on a particular topic, sample outputs include peer-reviewed academic papers, technical reports, cryptoeconomic models. For those who would like to contribute to this document with additional research currently not listed, please submit a pull request.
This list draws heavily from multiple sources, including the Ethereum Foundation, IC3, and [].
A note to early contributers: Before distributing this compiled list, we plan to to reach out to the parties cited to ensure they understand our goal is simply to compile (and make easier) the process for people to see the different work being done in the cryptocurrency space, and to increase visibility for potential research collaborations.
- SoK: Research Perspectives and Challenges for Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies
- Decentralized Systems Lab: University of Illinois, Dept of Electrical & Computer Engineering
- Ethereum Foundation: Research Problems (Vlad Zamfir) | (David Ernst)
- The Initiative For Cryptocurrencies & Smart Contracts: Cornell University
Scaling up blockchains to handle intensive global workloads for both permissionless decentralized blockchains, and permissioned/consortium blockchains supporting > 100,000 transactions/sec.
- Plasma
- TrueBit
- Generalized State Channels; Liam Horne, Jeff Coleman
- Sprites & State Channels; Andrew Miller
- Sharding
- Ethereum Scalability R&D Subsidy Programs
Making it easy, and even automatic, for blockchain developers to produce secure protocols and code, by utilizing (1) programming language techniques to create correct code, and (2) cryptographic protocols with security proofs.
Combining transparency with confidentiality in blockchains, by utilizing (1) cryptographic techniques, as well as (2) trusted-hardware.
Supporting a robust ecosystem of trustworthy data feeds for blockchains and contributing high-trust data feed solutions.
Enabling techniques and protocols for effective monitoring and targeted intervention in blockchains, informed by evaluations of traditional contract law and risks of crime in smart contracts.
Blockchain interoperability aims to make easier the process of independently designed blockchains to integrate well with each other, in a common protocol.
- Hash timelock atomic swaps
- Relays
- Tendermint
- 0x Protocol
Forked directly from Ethereum Foundation - Problems (old).
Problem: Come up with and implement methods for incentivizing public goods production in a decentralized environment.
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" This utility has one negative and one positive component.
- The positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
- The negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of –1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit--in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
- Tragedy of the Commons. Hardin, Garrett. Science, 1968
- Rules, Games, & Common Pool Resources. (Ostrom)
Define, outline, and test algorithmic incentive mechanisms which provide cryptoeconomic security.
- "Distributed Systems Meets Economics"; Wang, Microsoft Research Asia
- "Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design"; Cai, MIT
What centralized protocols can be decentralized (while preserving guarantees)?
- At what cost in protocol overhead?
- Are there limits to scalability?
- Only because of the requirement for shared state?
- At what cost in incentivization? What are the limits to incentivization?
- Limits to attribution
- Limits to mechanism budgets
- With how much security (against coordinated choice, trusted majority required)?
- Limits to fault tolerance
- e.g. in objective protocols and subjective protocols
Economists typically talk about “transaction costs” but I’m deliberately using the term “coordination costs”. Transactions (a la Coase) typically involve money, and certainly require at least contractual obligations. Coordination by contrast only depends on voluntary cooperation. Transaction costs will always be higher than coordination costs, because transactions require the ability to enforce the terms of the transaction. This imposes additional costs — often enormously larger costs.
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- Simple (crash) faults
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- Byzantine faults (arbitrary)
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- Uncoordinated majority (e.g., as in selfish mining)
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- Coordinated choice
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- Bribing attacker (as in P+epsilon attacks or iceman)
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- Behavioral economics models (endowment effect, loss aversion, morality, etc.)
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- Blackmail
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- Quantifying cooperative interactions among agents