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urvishp80 committed Dec 1, 2024
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
<id>2</id>
<title>Combined summary - Un-FE’d Covenants: Char-ting a new path to Emulated Covenants via BitVM Integrity Checks</title>
<updated>2024-12-01T02:54:58.537936+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>jeremy 2024-11-30 18:29:00+00:00</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Erik Aronesty 2024-11-30 17:19:00+00:00</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>jeremy 2024-11-27 03:05:00+00:00</name>
</author>
<link href="bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/m8423420dacdd1cb73ef8cdf320e3a0351fbd427a_Un-FE-d-Covenants-Char-ting-a-new-path-to-Emulated-Covenants-via-BitVM-Integrity-Checks.xml" rel="alternate"/>
<link href="bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/m28457287069e8273057ef1b1d0d8b8ca641e7f05_Un-FE-d-Covenants-Char-ting-a-new-path-to-Emulated-Covenants-via-BitVM-Integrity-Checks.xml" rel="alternate"/>
<link href="bitcoin-dev/Nov_2024/mdf4d5c5017c77c10dd14fa387208cbdf0b59dace_Un-FE-d-Covenants-Char-ting-a-new-path-to-Emulated-Covenants-via-BitVM-Integrity-Checks.xml" rel="alternate"/>
<generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="0.9.0">python-feedgen</generator>
<entry>
<id>2</id>
<title>Combined summary - Un-FE’d Covenants: Char-ting a new path to Emulated Covenants via BitVM Integrity Checks</title>
<updated>2024-12-01T02:54:58.537987+00:00</updated>
<link href="https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/[email protected]/T/#m8423420dacdd1cb73ef8cdf320e3a0351fbd427a" rel="alternate"/>
<summary>The email introduces a novel methodology for the implementation of Bitcoin covenants that cleverly circumvents the need for alterations to the Bitcoin protocol itself. This is achieved through an inventive use of covenant emulators alongside signing servers, setting it apart from prior methods aimed at simulating covenants. A pivotal aspect of this strategy is the imposition of a requirement for oracle signers to place bonds with BitVM auditors. These bonds are subjected to a risk of forfeiture under a specific BITVM style fraud proof regime, where any act of authorizing transactions in contravention of the established covenant rules could result in the loss of these funds. This serves as a deterrent against violations of covenant conditions by introducing a financial repercussion for non-compliance.

This approach is detailed further in a paper that elucidates the framework necessary for enforcing Bitcoin covenants without necessitating direct modifications to the blockchain's underlying protocol. The paper presents a comprehensive exploration of the mechanics behind this innovative solution, offering valuable insights into its potential application within the Bitcoin ecosystem. Interested parties can delve into the specifics of this proposal by accessing the document provided online, which promises an extensive analysis of the operational aspects of the proposed system. The discussed mechanism highlights a significant advancement in the realm of Bitcoin technology, proposing a viable solution for the implementation of covenants that preserves the integrity of the existing protocol. The full details of this approach, including theoretical underpinnings and practical implications, are available in the paper accessible via [this link](https://rubin.io/bitcoin/2024/11/26/unfed-covenants/), inviting further scrutiny and discussion among Bitcoin developers and enthusiasts alike.</summary>
<published>2024-11-30T18:29:00+00:00</published>
</entry>
</feed>
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
<id>1</id>
<title>Un-FE’d Covenants: Char-ting a new path to Emulated Covenants via BitVM Integrity Checks</title>
<updated>2024-12-01T02:54:49.477648+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Erik Aronesty 2024-11-30 17:19:00+00:00</name>
</author>
<generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="0.9.0">python-feedgen</generator>
<entry>
<id>1</id>
<title>Un-FE’d Covenants: Char-ting a new path to Emulated Covenants via BitVM Integrity Checks</title>
<updated>2024-12-01T02:54:49.477680+00:00</updated>
<link href="https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/[email protected]/T/#m28457287069e8273057ef1b1d0d8b8ca641e7f05" rel="alternate"/>
<summary>The discussion revolves around the concept of implementing Bitcoin covenants through an innovative approach that does not necessitate changes to the native protocol. This method involves the use of covenant emulators and signing servers, where oracle signers are required to post bonds to BitVM auditors. These bonds are subject to a BITVM style fraud proof system, allowing for the seizure of funds if an emulator oracle signs a transaction that breaches the covenant rules. This mechanism aims to secure the system by ensuring that the value locked in the bonds exceeds the value locked in the covenants, which is deemed a feasible restriction for various Layer 2 (L2) applications. Specifically, it targets enabling low-valued transactions, referred to as "vtxo's", that facilitate the emulation of self-custody for small amounts, which would be prohibitively costly to move on-chain otherwise.

The proposal underscores the necessity of analyzing the relationship between the bond lock value and the maximum safe covenant value, alongside the fees paid to oracles versus the potential loss of liquidity. Such analysis is crucial for driving incentives for both potential oracles and users, suggesting that while this model may not be suitable for vaulting use cases, it holds promise for protocols like ark2 and enigma-network, which are designed to support small-value transactions at scale.

For those interested in exploring this concept further, Jeremy provides a link to the paper detailing the proposed approach to unfed covenants, available at [https://rubin.io/bitcoin/2024/11/26/unfed-covenants/](https://rubin.io/bitcoin/2024/11/26/unfed-covenants/). This initiative represents a significant contribution to the ongoing conversation among Bitcoin developers about enhancing the flexibility and efficiency of Bitcoin transactions without altering the core protocol.</summary>
<published>2024-11-30T17:19:00+00:00</published>
</entry>
</feed>
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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
<id>1</id>
<title>Un-FE’d Covenants: Char-ting a new path to Emulated Covenants via BitVM Integrity Checks</title>
<updated>2024-12-01T02:54:38.541962+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>jeremy 2024-11-30 18:29:00+00:00</name>
</author>
<generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="0.9.0">python-feedgen</generator>
<entry>
<id>1</id>
<title>Un-FE’d Covenants: Char-ting a new path to Emulated Covenants via BitVM Integrity Checks</title>
<updated>2024-12-01T02:54:38.541996+00:00</updated>
<link href="https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/[email protected]/T/#m8423420dacdd1cb73ef8cdf320e3a0351fbd427a" rel="alternate"/>
<summary>In the discussion of enhancing security and incentivizing honesty in the context of vaults compared to systems like Ark, a novel approach is proposed focusing on the mechanics of signing oracles. The idea revolves around setting up a system where signing oracles receive payment over time for their services, promoting the operation of long-lasting, honest oracles due to the continuous revenue stream. This contrasts with the potential one-time gain from dishonest actions, thus encouraging the maintenance of integrity.

The method employs a key generation mechanism that operates privately, without the oracle's knowledge of the specific unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs) they might interact with. This setup ensures that oracles can't preemptively target UTXOs for malicious purposes, as they remain unaware of their existence until a signature request is submitted. An additional layer of security could be introduced by modifying the oracle to either blind sign transactions without learning their specifics or utilize homomorphic computations. These techniques allow for the verification of transactions without exposing sensitive details to the oracles or enabling them to broadcast transactions independently.

In a single-party vault scenario, this framework would not only deter misbehavior through the threat of punishment but also inherently limit the oracle's ability to steal coins directly. It suggests a model where a user might employ a 2-of-2 multisignature setup with their own key in tandem with the oracle, enforcing the agreed-upon ruleset collaboratively. However, the issue of ensuring continuous operation or "liveness" remains, which the author suggests addressing through mechanisms such as employing multiple "ultra cold" keys in combination with timelocks to secure the system further.</summary>
<published>2024-11-30T18:29:00+00:00</published>
</entry>
</feed>
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<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
<id>2</id>
<title>Combined summary - Great Consensus Cleanup Revival</title>
<updated>2024-11-28T02:27:41.649473+00:00</updated>
<updated>2024-12-01T02:49:46.162640+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>zawy 2024-11-28 00:59:45.176000+00:00</name>
<name>zawy 2024-11-30 22:52:09.676000+00:00</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>AntoineP 2024-11-27 14:50:19.148000+00:00</name>
<name>ajtowns 2024-11-30 09:28:17.207000+00:00</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>zawy 2024-11-27 14:48:15.789000+00:00</name>
<name>zawy . 2024-11-28 00:59:45.176000+00:00</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>AntoineP . 2024-11-27 14:50:19.148000+00:00</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>zawy . 2024-11-27 14:48:15.789000+00:00</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>ajtowns . 2024-11-27 00:13:24.105000+00:00</name>
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<author>
<name>AntoineP . 2024-03-24 19:53:27.073000+00:00</name>
</author>
<link href="delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3656_Great-Consensus-Cleanup-Revival.xml" rel="alternate"/>
<link href="delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3653_Great-Consensus-Cleanup-Revival.xml" rel="alternate"/>
<link href="delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3616_Great-Consensus-Cleanup-Revival.xml" rel="alternate"/>
<link href="delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3615_Great-Consensus-Cleanup-Revival.xml" rel="alternate"/>
<link href="delvingbitcoin/Nov_2024/3612_Great-Consensus-Cleanup-Revival.xml" rel="alternate"/>
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -231,13 +239,15 @@
<entry>
<id>2</id>
<title>Combined summary - Great Consensus Cleanup Revival</title>
<updated>2024-11-28T02:27:41.649835+00:00</updated>
<link href="https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710/57" rel="alternate"/>
<summary>The analysis of Matt Corallo's Great Consensus Cleanup proposal sheds light on several key areas within the Bitcoin protocol that could benefit from improvements to enhance network security and efficiency. Notably, the timewarp vulnerability poses a significant risk by allowing the artificial lowering of mining difficulty, thus threatening network stability and security. The proposal suggests adjusting retarget periods as a countermeasure to this exploit. Additionally, the potential for crafted non-SegWit transactions to slow down block validation times is identified as a concern. To mitigate these risks, limitations on legacy Script usage and the size of legacy transactions are proposed.
<updated>2024-12-01T02:49:46.163009+00:00</updated>
<link href="https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710/59" rel="alternate"/>
<summary>The discussion surrounding Matt Corallo's Great Consensus Cleanup proposal delves into critical vulnerabilities and inefficiencies within the Bitcoin protocol, proposing a series of improvements to enhance network security and performance. The analysis highlights the timewarp vulnerability as a significant threat that could potentially destabilize the network by artificially lowering mining difficulty. To counteract this, adjustments to retarget periods are suggested to safeguard against manipulation efforts.

Another focal point of the proposal is the risk posed by specially crafted non-SegWit transactions that could lead to increased block validation times, thereby hampering network efficiency. Proposed countermeasures include imposing restrictions on the use of legacy Script and capping the size of legacy transactions. The initiative also tackles vulnerabilities associated with the computation of the merkle root, specifically advocating for the invalidation of transactions 64 bytes or smaller to protect light clients and preserve blockchain integrity.

Furthermore, vulnerabilities related to the computation of the merkle root are addressed, with a focus on the risks posed by transactions of 64 bytes or less. Invalidating such transactions is proposed to protect light clients and preserve blockchain integrity. The proposal encourages community engagement to identify and rectify longstanding bugs and inefficiencies, underlining the importance of a collaborative approach to refining Bitcoin's architecture.
The collaborative spirit of the proposal is evident in its call for community engagement to jointly identify and rectify longstanding bugs and inefficiencies. While the proposal encompasses both consensus and contentious changes—ranging from straightforward fixes like addressing Merkle tree calculation issues and ensuring the uniqueness of Coinbase transactions to more debated suggestions like reducing the block size limit—the nuanced approach reflects an overarching goal of fortifying the protocol.

The discussion distinguishes between consensus and contentious changes, highlighting widely supported improvements like fixing Merkle tree calculation issues and ensuring Coinbase transaction uniqueness to bolster protocol robustness. However, the idea of reducing the block size limit has generated controversy due to concerns over its implications for network scalability and throughput. Additional suggestions for standardizing technical aspects, including mandating specific SIGHASH type bytes for Segwit v0 transactions and capping scriptPubKey sizes, aim at fortifying security and addressing scalability challenges. Despite their potential benefits, these proposals encounter skepticism, reflecting a cautious stance toward modifications that might constrain functionality or diverge from established norms in the Bitcoin community.</summary>
<published>2024-11-28T00:59:45.176000+00:00</published>
Contentious points, such as the reduction of the block size limit, have sparked considerable debate, underscoring concerns regarding potential impacts on network scalability and operational efficiency. Similarly, proposals aimed at standardizing technical aspects, including mandating specific SIGHASH type bytes for Segwit v0 transactions and setting limits on scriptPubKey sizes, are seen as measures to enhance security and address scalability challenges. However, these recommendations are met with a degree of skepticism, highlighting the community's cautious stance towards alterations that may compromise functionality or diverge from established norms.</summary>
<published>2024-11-30T22:52:09.676000+00:00</published>
</entry>
</feed>
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