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| <feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"> | ||
| <id>2</id> | ||
| <title>Combined summary - Trivial QC signatures with clean upgrade path</title> | ||
| <updated>2024-12-19T02:30:57.785485+00:00</updated> | ||
| <updated>2025-01-02T02:23:08.757612+00:00</updated> | ||
| <author> | ||
| <name>Ian Quantum 2025-01-02 00:43:00+00:00</name> | ||
| </author> | ||
| <author> | ||
| <name>David A. Harding 2025-01-01 08:38:00+00:00</name> | ||
| </author> | ||
| <author> | ||
| <name>David A. Harding 2025-01-01 08:37:00+00:00</name> | ||
| </author> | ||
| <author> | ||
| <name>Antoine Riard 2024-12-18 03:29:00+00:00</name> | ||
| </author> | ||
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| <author> | ||
| <name>Matt Corallo 2024-12-15 21:42:00+00:00</name> | ||
| </author> | ||
| <link href="bitcoin-dev/Jan_2025/m1feb6b49b48a60e9ac754bbbf207fe59af403e5e_Trivial-QC-signatures-with-clean-upgrade-path.xml" rel="alternate"/> | ||
| <link href="bitcoin-dev/Jan_2025/mcbd87f25fecd373ede7e49080e82742f1e522628_Trivial-QC-signatures-with-clean-upgrade-path.xml" rel="alternate"/> | ||
| <link href="bitcoin-dev/Jan_2025/m96ccf283f46134b71e0d35bf2eb9308f453c565f_Trivial-QC-signatures-with-clean-upgrade-path.xml" rel="alternate"/> | ||
| <link href="bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m73827bcbcd1619b8f1d4211c06af14501510be7b_Trivial-QC-signatures-with-clean-upgrade-path.xml" rel="alternate"/> | ||
| <link href="bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m17b51feb89a85ea944705900739874eb85027d69_Trivial-QC-signatures-with-clean-upgrade-path.xml" rel="alternate"/> | ||
| <link href="bitcoin-dev/Dec_2024/m4d5314c4692131d216b6d092573dbd74779127db_Trivial-QC-signatures-with-clean-upgrade-path.xml" rel="alternate"/> | ||
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| <entry> | ||
| <id>2</id> | ||
| <title>Combined summary - Trivial QC signatures with clean upgrade path</title> | ||
| <updated>2024-12-19T02:30:57.785561+00:00</updated> | ||
| <updated>2025-01-02T02:23:08.757701+00:00</updated> | ||
| <link href="https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/[email protected]/T/#m8c9407a48d3358be40fb94ab512c3e72b95e17cc" rel="alternate"/> | ||
| <summary>The recent discussions on the Bitcoin Development Mailing List have delved into the complexities of enhancing Bitcoin's security framework in anticipation of quantum computing (QC) threats. The contributors have highlighted several innovative proposals, ranging from integrating Winternitz one-time signature algorithms (WOTS) to exploring Proof of Quantum Capability (PoQC) as methods to transition towards post-quantum (PQ) cryptography. These discussions underscore a proactive approach in safeguarding Bitcoin against potential quantum computing breaches, with an emphasis on flexibility and gradual implementation of PQ cryptographic solutions. | ||
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| A significant portion of the debate has centered around the dilemma of initiating protective measures against QC threats without prematurely committing to specific changes that might become unnecessary if QC developments do not materialize as expected. Matt Corallo introduced the idea of a post-quantum fallback key and a consensus level proof of quantum computer (PoQC), aiming to minimize the activation impact of forks in response to QC threats. This involves monitoring for transactions that could indicate the breaking of cryptographic assumptions by a QC, triggering changes in consensus rules. Further discussions also explored the mitigation of coin loss or theft following a QC breakthrough, suggesting soft fork restrictions on key path spends or introducing new output types immune to QC attacks while maintaining backward compatibility. | ||
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| In another thread, Tadge Dryja and Anthony Towns discussed the preemptive integration of PQC options into wallets to secure funds against future QC threats. This strategy aims to mitigate risks associated with delaying PQ protection until it becomes an immediate necessity, potentially leaving many funds vulnerable. The dialogue acknowledged the speculative nature of certain aspects of this strategy, particularly regarding the technical specifics of future quantum computers and the crypto assumptions required for hard-fork spend-via-future-PQC-proof-of-knowledge approaches. | ||
| <summary>The ongoing discussions among Bitcoin developers about enhancing the network's security against potential quantum computing threats have shed light on various innovative proposals and considerations. One focal point is the challenge posed by post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and its integration into the Bitcoin protocol to safeguard against quantum attacks that could compromise cryptographic standards currently in place. The discourse has evolved around several key ideas aimed at preempting these threats, highlighting the community's proactive stance towards ensuring the long-term resilience of Bitcoin. | ||
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| Furthermore, the conversation shifted towards the potential challenges of implementing "OP_SPHINCS" signatures within the Bitcoin protocol due to their large size, which could significantly impact the number of inputs per block. This raised concerns about finding alternatives with smaller signature sizes or increasing block sizes to accommodate these larger signatures. The discussion also critiqued the idea of preemptively adding secret spend paths for OP_SPHINCS, highlighting the potential risks involved without clear benefits. | ||
| A significant portion of the conversation revolves around the adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms before the actualization of quantum computing capabilities that could threaten Bitcoin's security. Proposals such as integrating Winternitz one-time signature algorithms (WOTS) into wallets for a more flexible transition to PQC have been discussed. This approach allows for certification of public keys from future signature algorithms, providing a buffer period for research and development in the field. Moreover, there's an acknowledgment of the speculative nature of current quantum computing projections, emphasizing the need for adaptable solutions that can evolve with our understanding of quantum technology. | ||
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| Moreover, there was a focus on not waiting for the introduction of new script opcodes like OP_CAT due to prolonged deliberation and uncertainties related to Miner Extractable Value (MEV) and Bitcoin's development trajectory. A recommendation for wallet developers to begin integrating dedicated opcodes for smoother adoption was made, emphasizing the importance of preparing for quantum computing advancements while navigating operational challenges. | ||
| Another critical aspect discussed is the implementation of fallback mechanisms within Bitcoin's infrastructure to mitigate risks associated with quantum computing advancements. These include creating consensus-level proofs of quantum computer existence to trigger protective forks and developing output types immune to quantum decryption efforts. Such measures aim to provide a secure transition pathway that doesn't disrupt the underlying principles of blockchain technology while maintaining the integrity and continuity of the network amidst evolving threats. | ||
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| Lastly, the update on post-QC script path in Bitcoin's development, which does not require a softfork for commitment, suggested immediate actions for wallets to start integrating this fallback mechanism. However, the security of the post-QC script must be equivalent to that of a private key, presenting particular challenges for hardware wallets. | ||
| Moreover, the dialogue touches upon the complexities involved in adjusting Bitcoin's foundational structures to accommodate post-quantum secure protocols. Suggestions for modifying public keys to incorporate post-quantum elements and the potential for new script opcodes offer insights into the technical hurdles and strategic decisions facing developers. Despite these challenges, the emphasis remains on finding balanced solutions that preemptively safeguard the network without necessitating immediate, drastic changes. | ||
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| The collective discourse reflects a multifaceted approach towards incorporating quantum-resistant cryptographic measures within Bitcoin. By exploring various cryptographic and strategic solutions, the Bitcoin development community is laying the groundwork for a secure transition to post-quantum cryptography, ensuring the longevity and resilience of Bitcoin amidst emerging technological threats.</summary> | ||
| <published>2024-12-18T03:29:00+00:00</published> | ||
| Throughout these exchanges, the importance of continuing innovation and adaptation in cryptocurrency security is evident. By exploring various cryptographic and strategic solutions, the Bitcoin development community demonstrates a commitment to securing the network against emerging technologies. The discussions underscore a collective effort to anticipate future threats and ensure the longevity of Bitcoin through careful planning, research, and consensus-building.</summary> | ||
| <published>2025-01-02T00:43:00+00:00</published> | ||
| </entry> | ||
| </feed> | ||
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