Updated newly generated xml files

static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/3332_SuperScalar-Laddered-Timeout-Tree-Structured-Decker-Wattenhofer-Factories.xml

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+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
+  <id>1</id>
+  <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+  <updated>2024-10-09T02:19:15.075652+00:00</updated>
+  <author>
+    <name>Greg Sanders 2024-10-08 14:11:40.297000+00:00</name>
+  </author>
+  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="0.9.0">python-feedgen</generator>
+  <entry>
+    <id>1</id>
+    <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+    <updated>2024-10-09T02:19:15.075681+00:00</updated>
+    <link href="https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/superscalar-laddered-timeout-tree-structured-decker-wattenhofer-factories/1143/23" rel="alternate"/>
+    <summary>The concept of client-side commitment transactions involves leveraging multiple versions with varying feerates, which are primarily funded by the client's own resources, including any HTLCs (Hashed Time-Locked Contracts) they might have offered. This approach was influenced by Peter Todd's suggestion to make transaction fees endogenous, aiming for a more unified and efficient fee structure within a single transaction. However, this method introduces complexities, particularly in how it interacts with the underlying blockchain layer. Since the blockchain cannot definitively ascertain the most current state due to the nature of these transactions, determining the exact amount of "own funds" available for fee allocation during a dispute or challenge period becomes problematic.
+
+This reliance on an uncertain state further complicates the security model, especially considering the penalty mechanisms that are crucial for enforcing honesty within these transactions. The strategy does not fully account for potential collaboration between miners and counterparties, which could lead to exploitation by replaying outdated states with higher attached fees, thereby defrauding the Lightning Service Provider (LSP). 
+
+An alternative mentioned involves utilizing "non-contentious" funds within a transaction tree, as explored in the Timeout Tree paper. These funds, being off-chain, could theoretically simplify the use of funds without the aforementioned complexities. However, this solution would require locking liquidity for each user, a requirement that raises questions about scalability and practicality. The original discussion admits a lack of complete understanding regarding the implementation details of this proposed construction, highlighting the need for further exploration and clarification in developing a viable and secure method for managing client-side commitment transactions.</summary>
+    <published>2024-10-08T14:11:40.297000+00:00</published>
+  </entry>
+</feed>

static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/3333_SuperScalar-Laddered-Timeout-Tree-Structured-Decker-Wattenhofer-Factories.xml

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+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
+  <id>1</id>
+  <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+  <updated>2024-10-09T02:19:01.260747+00:00</updated>
+  <author>
+    <name>ariard 2024-10-08 21:40:46.271000+00:00</name>
+  </author>
+  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="0.9.0">python-feedgen</generator>
+  <entry>
+    <id>1</id>
+    <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+    <updated>2024-10-09T02:19:01.260777+00:00</updated>
+    <link href="https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/superscalar-laddered-timeout-tree-structured-decker-wattenhofer-factories/1143/24" rel="alternate"/>
+    <summary>The email discusses several critical aspects and concerns regarding the security and operability of time-sensitive contracting protocols within bitcoin scalability solutions, particularly focusing on off-chain scaling mechanisms. It highlights a significant flaw in the current model that allows counterparties to unilaterally fee-bump their off-chain states before the expiration of safety timelocks. This mechanism is problematic due to the potential inflation of transaction branch weights in worst-case scenarios, jeopardizing the feasibility of fair secret exchanges. The concern is that the latency in private key exchanges could enable less scrupulous service providers (LSPs) to exploit end users by failing to complete transactions before safety timelocks expire.
+
+Moreover, the correspondence touches upon the concept of making fees endogenous through pre-signed replacement lightning states, expressing skepticism about its viability, especially when significant amounts of bitcoin are involved in lightning channels. The writer questions the effectiveness of this approach and plans to discuss these limitations with Peter Todd, a known figure in the bitcoin community.
+
+In addition, the email raises doubts about the legitimacy of the recipient's affiliation and intentions, probing into whether their work on SuperScalar, an off-chain construction, is conducted as part of their employment at TBD, a subsidiary of Jack Dorsey’s Block Inc. This inquiry points towards concerns over potential bias or conflict of interest in promoting certain technological solutions over others.
+
+The conversation also criticizes the comparison between custodial and non-custodial wallets made by the recipient, suggesting that placing funds in established banking institutions like Silicon Valley Bank may be safer than relying on SuperScalar off-chain constructions. This statement underscores the skepticism towards the security and reliability of newer financial technologies compared to traditional banking solutions.
+
+Finally, the email addresses the need for consensus-level solutions to the "Forced Expiration Spam" problem detailed in the lightning network's whitepaper. This issue, identified by Tadge Dryja and Joseph Poon, has not seen significant academic or industry research to mitigate its impact on the scalability and functionality of bitcoin's off-chain mechanisms, such as factories and payment channels. The lack of progress in addressing this challenge underscores ongoing concerns within the bitcoin community about the practicality of achieving scalable and secure off-chain transactions.</summary>
+    <published>2024-10-08T21:40:46.271000+00:00</published>
+  </entry>
+</feed>

static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/3334_SuperScalar-Laddered-Timeout-Tree-Structured-Decker-Wattenhofer-Factories.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
+  <id>1</id>
+  <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+  <updated>2024-10-09T02:18:42.492902+00:00</updated>
+  <author>
+    <name>ZmnSCPxj 2024-10-08 22:10:19.679000+00:00</name>
+  </author>
+  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="0.9.0">python-feedgen</generator>
+  <entry>
+    <id>1</id>
+    <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+    <updated>2024-10-09T02:18:42.492932+00:00</updated>
+    <link href="https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/superscalar-laddered-timeout-tree-structured-decker-wattenhofer-factories/1143/25" rel="alternate"/>
+    <summary>The discussion emphasizes the potential vulnerabilities within the Lightning Network, a second-layer protocol designed to facilitate faster and more scalable transactions on the Bitcoin blockchain. The implication here is that if one possesses a strong conviction about the existence of certain flaws or vulnerabilities within the Lightning Network, then they are encouraged to practically demonstrate these weaknesses by targeting the network itself. This approach not only validates the concerns but also highlights the practical implications of such vulnerabilities, thereby contributing to the broader understanding and possibly the fortification of the network against identified issues. The challenge to demonstrate the problem on the actual Lightning Network underscores a call for empirical evidence rather than theoretical speculation, emphasizing the importance of real-world testing in assessing the robustness of blockchain technologies.</summary>
+    <published>2024-10-08T22:10:19.679000+00:00</published>
+  </entry>
+</feed>

static/delvingbitcoin/Oct_2024/3335_SuperScalar-Laddered-Timeout-Tree-Structured-Decker-Wattenhofer-Factories.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
+  <id>1</id>
+  <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+  <updated>2024-10-09T02:18:35.298531+00:00</updated>
+  <author>
+    <name>ZmnSCPxj 2024-10-09 01:05:29.175000+00:00</name>
+  </author>
+  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="0.9.0">python-feedgen</generator>
+  <entry>
+    <id>1</id>
+    <title>SuperScalar: Laddered Timeout-Tree-Structured Decker-Wattenhofer Factories</title>
+    <updated>2024-10-09T02:18:35.298561+00:00</updated>
+    <link href="https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/superscalar-laddered-timeout-tree-structured-decker-wattenhofer-factories/1143/26" rel="alternate"/>
+    <summary>The discussion surrounding the inversion of the timelock default in liquidity service provider (LSP) transactions introduces a novel approach to handling timeout defaults. Traditionally, the timeout favored the LSP, but a proposed shift could redefine how disputes and unilateral closures are managed. By altering the structure of transaction outputs, the new method aims to obligate the LSP to bear the cost of unilateral exits initiated by dissatisfied clients. This change pivots from the previous model where an `L &amp; CLTV` branch would determine fund distribution, toward a system where funds are directed to clients through an `nLockTime`d transaction. This transaction, which becomes effective at the timeout, ensures that clients have the potential to control the outcome more directly.
+
+In this revised setup, each node output that would have led to a client channel is designed to include not just the value of the client's channel, but also any reserve requirements, the shares of other client channels, and the liquidity stock held by the LSP for sales purposes. The critical aspect of this structure is that it grants clients unilateral power to execute these alternate timeout transactions, thereby compelling the LSP to preemptively manage unilateral exits to avoid significant financial losses. This mechanism essentially forces the LSP to engage more actively in facilitating assisted exits, incentivizing them to prevent clients from reaching a point of choosing unilateral closure due to dissatisfaction.
+
+Moreover, the strategy outlined provides a framework where the LSP is highly motivated to support assisted exits. For example, should feerates change significantly post an onchain assisted exit, a client can demand the LSP to re-sign the PTLC-claim transaction at a new rate. This creates an environment where the LSP, to avoid the costs associated with onchain fees for unilateral exits, has a vested interest in cooperating with clients during the exit process. The ability of the client to terminate the assisted exit process mirrors the choice of refusing one, pushing the LSP toward unilateral action if necessary. This restructuring of transaction output handling and the introduction of an `nLockTime`d alternative transaction signify a strategic shift intended to enhance fairness in the resolution of service disputes between clients and LSPs, ensuring that the LSPs are more accountable for the services provided.</summary>
+    <published>2024-10-09T01:05:29.175000+00:00</published>
+  </entry>
+</feed>