Minor edits to KZ report (#1620)

* Minor edits to KZ report

* Minor edit

content/post/2024-kazakhstan-report/index.md

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ categories: ["report"]
 
 In recent years, internet censorship in Kazakhstan has been [reported](https://freedomhouse.org/country/kazakhstan/freedom-net/2023) quite extensively. As part of this study, [OONI](https://ooni.org/), [Internet Freedom Kazakhstan (IFKZ)](https://ifkz.org/en), and [Eurasian Digital Foundation](https://www.digitalrights.asia) collaborated to investigate internet censorship in Kazakhstan over the past year (between June 2023 to June 2024) through the analysis of empirical network measurement data.
 
-In this report, we share OONI censorship measurement findings and relevant legal context. We found numerous [news media](https://explorer.ooni.org/search?probe_cc=KZ&test_name=web_connectivity&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&failure=false&category_code=NEWS&only=anomalies), [human rights](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&time_grain=day&probe_cc=KZ&axis_y=domain&domain=www.ipetitions.com%2Cwww.change.org%2Cegov.press%2Camnesty.org.ru), and [circumvention tool websites blocked](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&time_grain=day&probe_cc=KZ&axis_y=domain&category_code=ANON) in Kazakhstan by means of TLS interference. We also documented the use of the latest government-mandated root certificate authority (CA) – and its use to emit 6 distinct intermediate certificates – that were used to carry out [TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks](https://explorer.ooni.org/m/20210808015758.022737_KZ_webconnectivity_3b9213f9ee4f2d06), targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan. We share more details below.
+In this report, we share OONI censorship measurement findings and relevant legal context. We found numerous [news media](https://explorer.ooni.org/search?probe_cc=KZ&test_name=web_connectivity&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&failure=false&category_code=NEWS&only=anomalies), [human rights](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&time_grain=day&probe_cc=KZ&axis_y=domain&domain=www.ipetitions.com%2Cwww.change.org%2Cegov.press%2Camnesty.org.ru), and [circumvention tool websites blocked](https://explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?test_name=web_connectivity&axis_x=measurement_start_day&since=2023-06-01&until=2024-06-01&time_grain=day&probe_cc=KZ&axis_y=domain&category_code=ANON) in Kazakhstan by means of TLS interference. We also found 7 distinct intermediate certificates signed by 4 distinct root CAs being used to carry out TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan. We share more details below.
 
 {{<table-of-contents>}}
 
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ Overall, we did not detect strong cases involving the blocking of political webs
 
 What we mainly found as part of OONI data analysis is the **blocking of 73 circumvention tool websites**, as well as the **blocking of 17 news media websites and several human rights websites**. In almost all cases, the blocks appear to be implemented by means of **TLS interference**, as OONI data shows that the TLS handshakes result in [timeout errors](https://explorer.ooni.org/m/20240514233718.029308_KZ_webconnectivity_007c5a9f4031213d) after the Client Hello message. This is observed uniformly on all tested networks in Kazakhstan during the analysis period, providing a strong signal of blocking. It further suggests that ISPs in Kazakhstan implement censorship in a coordinated manner, perhaps through the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology.
 
-It’s worth highlighting that we [documented the use of the latest government-mandated root certificate authority (CA)](https://explorer.ooni.org/m/20210808015758.022737_KZ_webconnectivity_3b9213f9ee4f2d06) – and its use to emit 6 distinct intermediate certificates – that were used to carry out **TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan**.
+It’s worth highlighting that we **found 7 distinct intermediate certificates signed by 4 distinct root CAs being used to carry out TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks**, targeting at least 14 distinct domain names on at least 19 different networks in Kazakhstan.
 
 We share more details on the blocks in the following sections.