Merge pull request #699 from armarmgc/main

english-4-0: fix spelling and delete trailing whitespace

contents/english/4-1-identity-and-personhood.md

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Just as there are a range of government-issued identities that nonetheless share
 3. Because of 2), these network endpoint identitifiers are widely federated and are accepted for a range of authentication services online, including by services with a limited relationship with the SSO provider.
 
 
-There are two other important classes of entities that collect a lot of identity information or attributes about people.  They share many of these characteristics, but are not digital platform SSO systems and they do not have a direct relationship with the people about whom they collect information: advertizing, data brokers, credit-scoring and national security agencies (who develop dossiers on people for both general surveillance and their own screening purposes for employees who agree to be screened to get clearances to do their work).  
+There are two other important classes of entities that collect a lot of identity information or attributes about people.  They share many of these characteristics, but are not digital platform SSO systems and they do not have a direct relationship with the people about whom they collect information: advertising, data brokers, credit-scoring and national security agencies (who develop dossiers on people for both general surveillance and their own screening purposes for employees who agree to be screened to get clearances to do their work).
 
 They similarly rely on rich signals, with high integrity and fairly broad use, but without the public legitimacy of more standard government identities. These data collection systems thus stand on the opposite end of the trade-off spectrum from government identities.  They are far better at providing a rich profile about people, however they operate largely in the shadows because their "all-seeing" nature is socially illegitimate and vests a great deal of power in a few hands.