Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/…

…jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
  work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
  allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
  monolithic module (e.g.  SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).

  See
        https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/

  This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
  mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users.  Also, this is a
  useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"

* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
  tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
  vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
  tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
  ima: update builtin policies
  ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
  ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
  ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
  Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
  selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
  selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
  selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
  selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
  selinux: update netlink socket classes
  signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
  selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
  Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
  Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
  ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
  ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
  integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
  ...

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy

@@ -20,17 +20,19 @@ Description:
 		action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
 		condition:= base | lsm  [option]
 			base:	[[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
-				 [fowner]]
+				[euid=] [fowner=]]
 			lsm:	[[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
 				 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 			option:	[[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
 
 		base: 	func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
 				[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
-			mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
+			mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
+			       [[^]MAY_EXEC]
 			fsmagic:= hex value
 			fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
 			uid:= decimal value
+			euid:= decimal value
 			fowner:=decimal value
 		lsm:  	are LSM specific
 		option:	appraise_type:= [imasig]
@@ -49,11 +51,25 @@ Description:
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
 			# RAMFS_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+			# DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+			# BINFMTFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
 			# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
 			dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
 			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+			# SELINUX_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+			# CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+			# NSFS_MAGIC
+			dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+			dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
 
 			measure func=BPRM_CHECK
 			measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
@@ -70,10 +86,6 @@ Description:
 		Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
 		SELinux:
-			# SELINUX_MAGIC
-			dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-			dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-
 			dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
 			dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -1413,15 +1413,23 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
 			The list of supported hash algorithms is defined
 			in crypto/hash_info.h.
 
-	ima_tcb		[IMA]
+	ima_policy=	[IMA]
+			The builtin measurement policy to load during IMA
+			setup.  Specyfing "tcb" as the value, measures all
+			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
+			opened with the read mode bit set by either the
+			effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.
+			Format: "tcb"
+
+	ima_tcb		[IMA] Deprecated.  Use ima_policy= instead.
 			Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
 			Computing Base.  This means IMA will measure all
 			programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
 			opened for read by uid=0.
 
 	ima_template=   [IMA]
 			Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
-			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
+			Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
 			Default: "ima-ng"
 
 	ima_template_fmt=

Documentation/security/Smack.txt

@@ -206,11 +206,11 @@ netlabel
 	label. The format accepted on write is:
 		"%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
 onlycap
-	This contains the label processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+	This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
 	and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
 	these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
-	label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
-	file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+	label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated
+	by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
 ptrace
 	This is used to define the current ptrace policy
 	0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules.

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h

@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
 
+extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+					  struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+					  size_t hexlen);
 static inline
 const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
 {

crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c

@@ -104,28 +104,36 @@ static bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(
 	return false;
 }
 
+/* helper function can be called directly with pre-allocated memory */
+inline int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+				   struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+				   size_t hexlen)
+{
+	match_id->len = hexlen;
+	return hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen);
+}
+
 /**
  * asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
  * @id: The ID as a hex string.
  */
 struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
 {
 	struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
-	size_t hexlen;
+	size_t asciihexlen;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!*id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
-	hexlen = strlen(id);
-	if (hexlen & 1)
+	asciihexlen = strlen(id);
+	if (asciihexlen & 1)
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + hexlen / 2,
+	match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
 			   GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!match_id)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-	match_id->len = hexlen / 2;
-	ret = hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen / 2);
+	ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		kfree(match_id);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);

crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c

@@ -28,17 +28,30 @@ static bool use_builtin_keys;
 static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
 
 #ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+	struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+	unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
 static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
 {
 	if (!str)		/* default system keyring */
 		return 1;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
-		struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
-		p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3);
-		if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
-			pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
-		else if (!IS_ERR(p))
+		struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+		size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+		int ret;
+
+		if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+			pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+			return 1;
+		}
+
+		ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+		if (ret < 0)
+			pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+		else
 			ca_keyid = p;	/* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
 	} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
 		use_builtin_keys = true;

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c

@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->cmd_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
 	if (!priv->cmd) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the command buffer failed\n");
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int crb_acpi_add(struct acpi_device *device)
 
 	memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
 	pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
-	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+	priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
 					 ioread32(&priv->cca->rsp_size));
 	if (!priv->rsp) {
 		dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the response buffer failed\n");

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm.c

@@ -578,6 +578,9 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
+	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
+	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
+
 	crq_q = &ibmvtpm->crq_queue;
 	crq_q->crq_addr = (struct ibmvtpm_crq *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!crq_q->crq_addr) {
@@ -622,8 +625,6 @@ static int tpm_ibmvtpm_probe(struct vio_dev *vio_dev,
 
 	crq_q->index = 0;
 
-	ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
-	ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
 	TPM_VPRIV(chip) = (void *)ibmvtpm;
 
 	spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);

drivers/char/tpm/tpm_of.c

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int read_log(struct tpm_bios_log *log)
 
 	basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL);
 	if (basep == NULL) {
-		pr_err(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
+		pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
 		goto cleanup_eio;
 	}
 

fs/xattr.c

@@ -298,18 +298,18 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 
 	mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
-	if (error) {
-		mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-		return error;
-	}
+	if (error)
+		goto out;
 
 	error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
-	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 
 	if (!error) {
 		fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
 		evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
 	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
 	return error;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);