remove direct mention of DNSSEC & RPKI

draft-dekater-scion-pki.md

@@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ SCION’s trust architecture fundamentally differs from a global monopolistic tr
 
 ### Compromise of an ISD
 
-Compared to DNSSEC and RPKI, in SCION there is no central authority that could "switch off" an ISD, as each ISD relies on its own independent cryptographic trust roots. Each AS within an ISD is therefore dependant on its ISD's PKI for its functioning. This section discusses potential compromises of the PKI at various levels of the hierarchy.
+Compared to other trust architectures, in SCION there is no central authority that could "switch off" an ISD, as each ISD relies on its own independent cryptographic trust roots. Each AS within an ISD is therefore dependant on its ISD's PKI for its functioning. This section discusses potential compromises of the PKI at various levels of the hierarchy.
 
 - On TRC level: The private root keys of the root certificates contained in an TRC are used to sign CA certificates. If one of these private root keys is compromised, the adversary could issue illegitimate CA certificates which may be used in further attacks. To maliciously  perform a TRC update, an attacker would need to compromise multiple voting keys. This number depends on the voting quorum set in the TRC: the higher the quorum, the more unlikely a malicious update will be.
 - On CA level: The private keys of an ISD's CA certificates are used to sign the AS certificates. All ASes within an ISD obtain certificates directly from the CAs. If one of the CA’s keys is compromised, an adversary could issue illegitimate AS certificates, which may be used in further attacks.