Branch was auto-updated.

detections/endpoint/auto_admin_logon_registry_entry.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Auto Admin Logon Registry Entry
 id: 1379d2b8-0f18-11ec-8ca3-acde48001122
-version: 1
-date: '2021-09-06'
+version: 2
+date: '2020-01-28'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -12,12 +12,19 @@ description: this search is to detect a suspicious registry modification to impl
   continue encrypting the whole network. This behavior is not a common practice and
   really a suspicious TTP or alert need to be consider if found within then network
   premise.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows
-  NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" AND Registry.registry_key_name=AutoAdminLogon AND
-  Registry.registry_value_name=1 by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
-  Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  |`security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry 
+  where Registry.registry_path= "*SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*" 
+  AND Registry.registry_value_name=AutoAdminLogon 
+  AND Registry.registry_value_data=1 
+  by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid 
+  | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
+  | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name 
+  | `auto_admin_logon_registry_entry_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure

detections/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.yml

@@ -1,20 +1,26 @@
 name: Monitor Registry Keys for Print Monitors
 id: f5f6af30-7ba7-4295-bfe9-07de87c01bbc
-version: 2
-date: '2020-11-23'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
+version: 3
+date: '2020-01-28'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with modifications
   to the registry key `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Monitors`. In this
   scenario, an attacker can load an arbitrary .dll into the print-monitor registry
   by giving the full path name to the after.dll. The system will execute the .dll
   with elevated (SYSTEM) permissions and will persist after reboot.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.action=modified AND
-  Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" by Registry.dest,
-  Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name
-  Registry.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry 
+  where Registry.action=modified AND Registry.registry_path="*CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*" 
+  by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid 
+  | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
+  | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name 
+  | `monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data
   that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model
   in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response
@@ -41,6 +47,7 @@ tags:
   - Stage:Privilege Escalation
   dataset:
   - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+  - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log
   impact: 80
   kill_chain_phases:
   - Actions on Objectives

detections/endpoint/registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases.yml

@@ -1,17 +1,23 @@
 name: Registry Keys for Creating SHIM Databases
 id: f5f6af30-7aa7-4295-bfe9-07fe87c01bbb
-version: 3
-date: '2020-11-26'
-author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
+version: 4
+date: '2020-01-28'
+author: Bhavin Patel, Patrick Bareiss, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel: []
 description: This search looks for registry activity associated with application compatibility
   shims, which can be leveraged by attackers for various nefarious purposes.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name)
-  as registry_key_name min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
   where Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\Custom* OR Registry.registry_path=*CurrentVersion\\AppCompatFlags\\InstalledSDB*
-  by Registry.dest Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
+  by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid 
+  | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] 
+  | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data
+  | `registry_keys_for_creating_shim_databases_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you must populate the Change_Analysis
   data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection and response product,
   such as Carbon Black or other endpoint data sources such as Sysmon. The data used

detections/endpoint/sdclt_uac_bypass.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: Sdclt UAC Bypass
 id: d71efbf6-da63-11eb-8c6e-acde48001122
-version: 1
-date: '2021-07-01'
+version: 2
+date: '2020-01-28'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -10,13 +10,19 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious sdclt.exe registry modificati
   This technique is commonly seen when attacker try to bypassed UAC by using sdclt.exe
   application by modifying some registry that sdclt.exe tries to open or query with
   payload file path on it to be executed.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App
-  Paths\\control.exe*" OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\*")
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry 
+  where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\App Paths\\control.exe*" 
+  OR Registry.registry_path= "*\\exefile\\shell\\runas\\command\\*")
   (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "IsolatedCommand")
-  by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
-  Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`'
+  by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid 
+  | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
+  | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name 
+  | `sdclt_uac_bypass_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Processes` node.

detections/endpoint/silentcleanup_uac_bypass.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: SilentCleanup UAC Bypass
 id: 56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122
-version: 1
-date: '2021-07-01'
+version: 2
+date: '2020-01-28'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -10,11 +10,18 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that
   related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the
   silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User
   control account.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir"
-  Registry.registry_value_name = "*.exe*" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name
-  Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry 
+  where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir"
+  Registry.registry_value_data = "*.exe*" 
+  by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid 
+  | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
+  | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name
+  | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure

detections/endpoint/wsreset_uac_bypass.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 name: WSReset UAC Bypass
 id: 8b5901bc-da63-11eb-be43-acde48001122
-version: 1
-date: '2021-07-01'
+version: 2
+date: '2020-01-28'
 author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
 type: TTP
 datamodel:
@@ -10,12 +10,18 @@ description: This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry rela
   to UAC bypass. This technique is to modify the registry in this detection, create
   a registry value with the path of the payload and run WSreset.exe to bypass User
   account Control.
-search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
-  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*"
-  (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute")
-  by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name
-  Registry.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`'
+search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry 
+  where Registry.registry_path= "*\\AppX82a6gwre4fdg3bt635tn5ctqjf8msdd2\\Shell\\open\\command*"
+  AND (Registry.registry_value_name = "(Default)" OR Registry.registry_value_name = "DelegateExecute")
+  by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
+  by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
+  | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
+  |rename process_guid as proc_guid 
+  | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
+  | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name
+  | `wsreset_uac_bypass_filter`'
 how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information
   on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from
   your endpoints into the `Endpoint` datamodel in the `Registry` node. Also make sure

tests/endpoint/monitor_registry_keys_for_print_monitors.test.yml

@@ -7,6 +7,6 @@ tests:
   latest_time: 'now'
   attack_data:
   - file_name: windows-sysmon.log
-    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.001/atomic_red_team/windows-sysmon.log
+    data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1547.010/atomic_red_team/sysmon.log
     source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
     sourcetype: xmlwineventlog